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Nontechnical summary 
 
 
Over the last years, educational systems around the world have increasingly been evaluated 
and subjected to scientific as well as political debate. Recent large scale performance tests of 
students by international organizations like the IEA and OECD aim at establishing an 
internationally comparable account of student performance and triggered the debate on school 
quality. One important aspect of the debate that is the topic of this study is the equality of 
educational opportunity, i.e. how strongly educational performance is determined by the 
background of students. The intergenerational mobility of human capital, and hence of 
income, depends on the degree of equality in educational opportunities. In many countries, the 
debate on providing equal educational opportunities focuses on institutional features of the 
schooling systems such as the use of streaming and public vs. private schools. It is often 
argued that the access to schools of higher quality depends on the social background of 
students. A heterogeneous schooling system with various school types and many private 
schools is claimed to rather benefit students from a high compared to a low social 
background. Other institutional feature like the amount of instruction time are instead 
considered to be positively associated with educational opportunity because students spend 
more time together and less time with their parents. 
The aim of this paper is twofold. First, it intends to assess the extent to which student 
background affects student performance at two stages in a student’s life. This describes the 
educational opportunity that students face at different stages within a particular schooling 
system. Second, the paper aims at exploring whether cross-country differences in educational 
opportunities are related to essential features of educational systems. This step of the analysis 
provides empirical evidence on the link between institutional settings and educational 
opportunity and seeks to elaborate on better frameworks for more equal opportunities.  
The estimation strategy applied in this study aims at a consistent estimation of the link 
between institutions and educational opportunities. A difference-in-differences estimation 
approach is employed in order to explain changes in educational opportunities over time 
(measured by student age) by changes in institutional features. Thereby, country-specific 
factors besides the schooling system that bias any simple cross-country analysis of the role of 
institutions can be largely eliminated. The analysis builds on internationally comparable 
micro data from the two studies PIRLS (Progress in International Reading Literacy Study) 
and PISA (Programme for International Student Assessment) on student performance in 14 
mainly European countries. The schooling systems are analyzed at grade four and grade 
nine/ten, two important points in a child’s development and in the schooling system.  
The estimation of the effects of student background on student performance shows that 
educational opportunities seem to increase for individuals with the right attitude towards 
education although the overall degree of equality of educational opportunity decreases. The 
results indicate that there are several dimensions of educational opportunities, which develop 
differently with student age. 
It can be shown that schooling institutions are linked to educational opportunities of 
students. The effect of social origin on student performance, measured by the number of 
books at home and parental education, increases in countries with a differentiated schooling 
system with several school types or a high share of private schools. This supports the 
hypothesis that streaming and private education benefit the performance of students from a 
better social background. The time students spend in schools seems to limit the effect of 
social background upon student performance, while school autonomy is positively linked to 
parental influence.  
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Abstract:  
Educational opportunities determine the intergenerational mobility of human 
capital and are affected by institutional features of schooling systems. The aim of 
this paper is twofold. It intends to show how strongly student performance 
depends on student background at two important stages in a student’s life as well 
as to explain cross-country differences in educational opportunities by schooling 
institutions. A difference-in-differences estimation approach is applied to control 
for country-specific effects. The results imply that educational opportunities 
decrease with student age in most countries. However, the attitude of parents 
seems to become more important while the impact of social origin decreases. A 
greater differentiation of the schooling system as indicated by streaming and 
private schools is associated with a greater effect of social background while 
more instruction time limits the impact of social origin on student performance. 
Higher school autonomy increases the impact of parental influence. 
 
 
JEL Classification: I21, J62 
Keywords: Equality of educational opportunity, student performance, institutions, PISA, 
PIRLS 
                                                          
* I would like to thank John Bishop, Lex Borghans, Bernd Fitzenberger, Hans Heijke, Charlotte Lauer, François 
Laisney, Alexander Spermann, Ludger Woessmann and participants at the SOLE/EALE meeting in San 
Francisco and ROA seminar in Maastricht for helpful comments and Marc Vothknecht for excellent research 
assistance. Financial support from the Fritz Thyssen Foundation under the project “Bildungschancen zwischen 
Grundschule und Sekundarstufe” is gratefully acknowledged. The usual disclaimer applies. 
 1
1 Introduction 
Over the last years, educational systems around the world have increasingly been evaluated 
and subjected to scientific as well as political debate. Recent large scale performance tests of 
students by international organizations like the IEA and OECD aim at establishing an 
internationally comparable account of student performance and triggered the debate on school 
quality. The importance that is directed at school education is supported by a growing 
literature that stresses the extent to which schooling quality affects the earning prospects of 
students (e.g. Bishop, 1992) and economic growth (e.g. Barro, 2001). One important aspect of 
education that is the topic of this study is the degree of equality of educational opportunity, 
i.e. how strongly educational performance is determined by the background of students. The 
intergenerational mobility of human capital and hence of income depends on the degree of 
equality in educational opportunities (e.g. Björklund and Jäntti, 1997; Dearden, Machin and 
Reed, 1997). Thereby, social mobility within societies is largely determined by educational 
opportunities. From an economic point of view, e.g. an extremely low degree of equality in 
opportunities would imply that investment in human capital depends less on innate ability and 
more on social origin, which leads to a non-optimal investment in human capital of 
individuals. Thus, educational opportunities are likely to affect also significant economic 
outcomes like economic growth through e.g. possible spillovers from higher education (e.g. 
Audretsch et al., 2004). In many countries, the debate on providing equal educational 
opportunities focuses on institutional features of the schooling systems such as the use of 
streaming and public vs. private schools. It is often argued that the access to schools of higher 
quality depends on the social background of students. A heterogeneous schooling system with 
various school types and many private schools is claimed to rather benefit students from a 
high compared to a low social background. Other institutional feature like the amount of 
instruction time are instead considered to be positively associated with educational 
opportunity because students spend more time together and less time with their parents. 
The aim of this paper is twofold. First, it intends to show how strongly student 
background affects student performance at two stages in a student’s life. This describes the 
degree of equality of educational opportunity that students face at different stages within a 
particular schooling system. Besides social background also the attitude of parents towards 
their child’s education and student characteristics will be considered in order to describe the 
various dimensions of educational opportunity. Second, the paper aims at exploring whether 
cross-country differences in educational opportunities are related to essential features of 
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educational systems. This step of the analysis provides empirical evidence on the link 
between institutional settings and educational opportunities, and seeks to elaborate on better 
frameworks for equal opportunities. The analysis builds on internationally comparable micro 
data from two studies (PIRLS and PISA) on student performance in 14 countries. The 
schooling systems are analyzed at grade four and grade nine/ten, two important points in a 
child’s development and in the schooling system. The first point is associated with the end of 
primary education in many countries while the second often constitutes the end of compulsory 
education. The impact of the following schooling institutions is analyzed: The number of 
school types / use of streaming in school systems, annual instruction time, share of students in 
private schools and school autonomy. These institutions have been chosen because they are 
likely to affect educational opportunities of students rather than student performance and are 
at the center of the debate on how to improve the equality of educational opportunity in many 
countries. Moreover, the institutions vary between the countries considered here but hardly 
within countries and are hence well-suited for this cross-country analysis. 
  Previous literature that deals with certain aspects of schooling quality is abundant. In 
the literature, schooling quality is measured predominantly either by student performance in 
standardized tests, or by grades and graduation or dropout rates. Common facts emerging 
from the literature are the large and internationally comparable effects of student background 
on performance. In the recent literature that considers explicitly the social background of 
students, most studies refer to only one country or small groups of countries (Ammermueller 
et. al, 2005; Ammermueller, 2004, 2005; Woessmann, 2003a). Larger comparisons that 
include a wide range of countries have been conducted as well (Hanushek and Luque, 2002; 
Woessmann, 2004) but analyze the schooling system at only one stage. Moreover, the 
respective literature describes the educational opportunities of students but does not explain 
cross-country differences. Further literature addresses specific issues such as school resources 
(Betts, 2001; Hanushek, 2003; Hoxby, 2000), the use of streaming in schools (Cappellari, 
2004; Figlio and Page, 2000), the effects of private versus public schools (Figlio and Ludwig, 
2000; Neal, 1997; Vandenberghe and Robin, 2004) or peer effects in schools (Glewwe, 1997; 
Rivkin, 2001; Toma and Zimmer, 2000). This evidence relates mostly to the U.S. and only 
rarely takes an international perspective. Further literature that focuses on the role of student 
background on different outcome variables such as years of schooling or labor market 
outcomes underlines the importance of social background (Brunello and Checci, 2003; 
Ermisch and Francesconi, 2001) and even shows that the social background impacts both 
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through the genes and the education that are transmitted by parents to their children, while the 
former appears to be slightly more important (Plug and Vijverberg, 2003). 
The role of institutions in determining the quality of schooling has been investigated 
by several recent papers, which were also based on international studies on student 
performance (Vandenberghe and Robin, 2004; Woessmann, 2003b). The approach followed 
in most studies is to determine the effect of institutional settings on student performance by 
estimating educational production functions (e.g. Fuchs and Woessmann, 2004) or applying a 
matching approach (e.g. Vandenberghe and Robin, 2004). However, in an international 
comparison one cannot perfectly control for cultural and societal differences between 
countries. Therefore, only institutional features that vary within countries can be reasonably 
analyzed (cf. Ammermueller, 2004). The effects of institutional settings like the structure of 
schooling systems, the length of the school year or other features that apply to all students 
within a country cannot be consistently estimated in such cross-country analyses. Hanushek 
and Woessmann (2005) follow a similar approach as is used in this paper by looking at 
difference-in-differences evidence from two student performance studies to assess the impact 
of streaming in secondary schools on overall inequality. However, they focus only on one 
institutional factor and one measure of inequality and do not exploit the micro-level data. 
Thereby, the effects on the different dimensions of educational opportunities cannot be 
examined and possible other sources of inequality are ignored by their approach. 
The estimation strategy employed here aims at a consistent estimation of the link 
between institutions and educational opportunities. A difference-in-differences approach is 
applied in order to explain changes in educational opportunities over time (measured by 
student age) by changes in institutional features. Thereby, country-specific factors besides the 
schooling system can be largely controlled for, assuming they are identical for students of age 
nine/ten and fifteen. Attention is also paid to the comparability of cross-sectional student 
performance studies. 
A comparison of the PIRLS and PISA studies indicates that differences in mean scores 
are negatively linked to differences in standard deviations, i.e. an increase in mean scores is 
associated with a decrease in the spread of scores. The estimation of the effects of student 
background on student performance shows that the absolute effect of gender, the amount of 
books at home, the school location and parents‘ attitude increases between the end of primary 
and lower secondary education in most countries, while the effect of parental education seems 
to decrease. Therefore, educational opportunities seem to increase for individuals with the 
right attitude towards education. Moreover, the results show that there are several student 
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background factors which have an impact on student performance. Hence, educational 
opportunities are not one-dimensional. There is a considerable amount of variation in the 
changes of educational opportunities over a student’s schooling career between countries. It 
remains unclear what part of the changes in educational opportunities is due to differences 
between the studies and what changes really take place, though.   
It can be shown that schooling institutions that are determined by school policy are 
linked to educational opportunities of students. The social origin of students, measured by the 
number of books at home and parental education, increases its effect on student performance 
rather in countries with a differentiated schooling system with several school types and a large 
private school sector. This supports the hypothesis that streaming benefits the performance of 
students from a better social background. The time students spend in schools seems to limit 
the effect of parents upon student performance while school autonomy is positively linked to 
parental influence.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section two introduces the two data sets and compares 
them. The estimation strategy is outlined in section three. Section four discusses the results of 
the estimations of the educational production functions while section five presents the 
evidence on the role of the schooling systems. Section six concludes. 
2 Data 
The data from two international studies on student performance in reading literacy are taken 
for the analysis of 14 countries. The Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) 
tested 15 year-old students while the Progress in International Reading Literacy Study 
(PIRLS) refers to the performance of students in grade four (age 9 to 10). The countries that 
are included in both studies and provide the necessary background information are Canada 
(CAN), the Czech Republic (CZE), England (ENG), France (FRA), Germany (DEU), Greece 
(GRC), Hungary (HUN), Iceland (ISL), Italy (ITA), Latvia (LVA), New Zealand (NZL), 
Norway (NOR), Russia (RUS) and Sweden (SWE)1. Information on the participation in 
PIRLS and PISA on school and student level is given for both studies in Table A1. Tables A2 
and A3 present the means and standard deviations for the data. The following sections 
describe both studies and discuss the handling of missing values and the comparability of the 
data in addition. 
                                                          
1 In PIRLS, Canada is represented only by the provinces of Ontario and Quebec and only England is sampled 
while in PISA, the whole of Canada and Great Britain are sampled. Therefore, the analysis that considers the role 
of the schooling systems is conducted both including and excluding the two countries. The United States 
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2.1 The PIRLS study 
Thirty-five countries participated in the Progress in International Reading Literacy Study 
(PIRLS). This study was conducted by the International Association for the Evaluation of 
Educational Achievement (IEA) in 2001 and tested fourth grade students (nine- and ten-year-
olds) in reading literacy. In the data, extensive information on home and school environments 
is available through student, parent, teacher and school questionnaires. With 150,000 students 
tested, PIRLS 2001 is the first in a planned 5-year cycle of international trend studies in 
reading literacy (Mullis et al., 2003). 
The data are clustered due to the two-stage stratified sampling design of the study. The 
schools that participated have been chosen first, before a sample of classes from the targeted 
grade was drawn. Therefore, the schools are the primary sampling units and not the classes or 
students. 
Student performance is measured by test scores in reading literacy, which is the most 
important basic competency needed to acquire further skills and knowledge and to 
successfully participate in social life (Mullis et al., 2003). The test scores are plausible values 
that are drawn from an estimated proficiency distribution. Plausible values are imputed scores 
based on the students’ answers to the test items (cf. Mislevy, 1991). The scores have then 
been standardized, to an international mean of 500 and a standard deviation of 100, which 
facilitates the comparison across countries. Figure A1 in the appendix displays the mean 
scores and their standard deviations for all 14 countries in a scatter plot. The negative trend 
line implies that countries with higher mean test scores tend to have a lower spread of scores 
but the relationship is not significant. The high standard deviations in New Zealand and 
England are striking. 
2.2 The PISA study 
The Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) tested 15 year-old students in 
the subjects mathematics, science and reading proficiency in the first half of 2000. The goal 
was not to test only the knowledge of students but rather their understanding of the subject 
matter and ability to apply the acquired knowledge to different situations. The testing was 
conducted by the OECD throughout its 28 member countries plus Brazil, Latvia, 
Liechtenstein and the Russian Federation. Apart from test scores, data from student, school 
and computer questionnaires were collected. These include information on the student 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
participated in both studies but provides no information on parents in PIRLS. The U. S. is included in the graphs 
comparing the two studies but not in the later analysis. 
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background, the availability and use of resources as well as the institutional setting at schools 
(Adams and Wu, 2002).  
 PISA uses also a two-stage stratified sampling design, which differs slightly from the 
sample design for PIRLS because the targeted population is not a specific grade but students 
aged 15. Therefore, schools have been sampled first and then students from the targeted 
population have been drawn randomly. The scores used for the analysis are plausible values 
as in the PIRLS data and are standardized in the same way.2 However, the sample of countries 
differs for the two studies. The scores have not been rescaled to account for the difference in 
the sampled countries because it is unknown in how far student performance and its variation 
differ between the two grades and in how far the difference in the tests impacts on this. The 
weighted means and standard deviations of the scores and the student background variables 
used in the analysis are presented in Table A2 in the appendix. Figure A2 shows that no 
relationship between mean test scores and the standard deviations seems to exist across 
countries. Germany is an outlier with an extremely high spread of scores. 
2.3 Imputation of missing values 
Missing values for the student background variables are the main problem of the data from 
both studies. Test scores are reported for all students but some students did not complete the 
tests. Table A4 presents the percentage of missing values for all variables and countries. 
Commonly, the whole observation (student) is dropped from the regression whenever the 
value of any explanatory variable is missing. Including several variables in the regression thus 
leads to a great reduction in the number of observations that can be used for the estimations. 
In ENG, 65 percent of the students in PIRLS would have been dropped for example. Apart 
from losing valuable information, dropping students with incomplete answers to the 
questionnaires leads to a sample selection bias if the values are not missing randomly 
conditional on student performance. Indeed, given that attentive students are more likely to 
both complete the questionnaire and to answer the test questions, low performing students 
have a higher probability of being dropped. Thus, dropping the observations with missing 
values leads to an upward bias in the test scores, which can be seen in Table A3, which 
displays the means and standard deviations of the data without the imputed values.  
The approach chosen here to overcome the problem of missing data is to predict 
missing values on the basis of regressions on those background variables like age, sex and the 
                                                          
2 The description of the imputation methods for the plausible values in PIRLS and PISA in the technical reports 
indicates that the methods are similar. Still, it has to be assumed that possible minor difference do not bias the 
results. 
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grade a student attends that are available for all students. Linear models are used for 
continuous variables and probit and ordered probit models for qualitative variables.3 Students 
who did not answer these elementary background questions or did not complete the tests have 
been excluded from the regressions. Students for who most of the values were missing have 
also been excluded.  
The prediction of missing values on the basis of regression results is clearly no 
impeccable solution. The variation of the variables decreases, as can be seen in the lower 
standard deviations of the variables including the imputed values as compared to the original 
data (see Table A2 and A3). However, the imputed values vary greatly as well and the 
information of the non-imputed values of the observation is kept. Several other empirical 
studies that apply this method to test score data show that the imputation has no effect on the 
qualitative results (e.g. Ammermueller et al., 2005; Woessmann, 2004). 
2.4 Comparability of the studies 
Certainly, the studies have not been designed to be comparable to each other and they differ 
partially. However, both studies use the same concept, to test students’ understanding rather 
than knowledge and they depend little on national curricula, making the studies 
internationally comparable. As the samples of countries differ, the mean scores are not 
directly comparable. For the sample considered in this study, the average PIRLS scores are 
mostly higher than the average PISA scores, which can be explained by low scoring non-
OECD countries that are sampled in PIRLS but not in PISA. Figure 1 shows that there is a 
slight positive relationship, which is not significant, between the PIRLS and PISA outcomes 
but that PIRLS scores are mostly higher. 
                                                          
3 For a more detailed discussion of the imputation method, see Woessmann (2003b). 
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Figure 1: Mean test scores in PIRLS and PISA 
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Figure 2: Difference in test scores and standard deviations between PISA and PIRLS 
Figure 2 shows the relationship between the difference between PIRLS and PISA in mean test 
scores and in the standard deviations. The negative slope of the trend line, which is significant 
at the one percent level, implies that an increase in mean scores is associated with a decrease 
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of the spread of scores. The greatest outlier is Germany, whose standard deviation increased 
immensely from the PIRLS to the PISA study. This finding further motivates this study 
because more equal educational opportunities seem to be positively linked to higher mean test 
scores. 
The relevant variables like parents’ education and number of books at home have been 
transformed in the data in order to be comparable. All student background variables have 
been transformed into dummies except student age. The effects of the student background 
variables should therefore not only be comparable across countries but also across studies. 
Table A5 presents the correlation coefficients between the country means from the two 
studies for variables which should have similar mean values, although the sample of students 
and their age differ. For the origin of parents, the number of books at home and the school 
location the correlation coefficients are reasonably high both for the mean values computed 
with and without the imputed values. Especially the high coefficients for books at home 
indicate that this is a trustworthy measure of home resources. The coefficients are quite low 
instead for the language spoken at home and some categories of parents’ education, especially 
for the country means including imputed values. This may be due to the fact that different 
categories are used in the studies to report education and that the share of missing values for 
education is relatively high (see Table A4). In PIRLS, the share of secondary schooling is 
relatively high compared to PISA, in which the share of university education is relatively high 
for most countries.  
The studies have been conducted in 2000 (PISA) and 2001 (PIRLS). The lag of one year 
should not affect the comparability, as long as the studies themselves have been carried out in 
a short time span. The determinants of test scores should therefore be comparable as well. 
Even if the studies differ somewhat, the difference should be systematic across all countries 
and any deviations from a common pattern can still be explained by schooling systems. 
Therefore, the comparison of the descriptive evidence but not the analysis on the link between 
institutions and educational opportunity depends crucially on the comparability of the two 
studies. 
3 Estimation strategy 
This section first shows how educational opportunities are estimated and then derives the 
estimation strategy for estimating the link between educational opportunities and schooling 
institutions. 
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3.1 Estimating the effect of student background on student performance  
A thorough comparison of student performance in the schooling systems of the countries 
presupposes the knowledge of the process by which education is produced. Educational 
production functions provide a means of understanding the production process by estimating 
the effects that various inputs have on student achievement. For the estimation to yield 
unbiased estimates of the effects, all current and prior inputs that are likely to determine 
educational performance should be included in the production function. The cross-sectional 
PIRLS and PISA data give information on the background of each student, the current school 
resources including teacher characteristics as well as the institutional setting at the school 
level. However, no information on prior achievement of students or inputs into educational 
production at another time is available. This missing information on prior inputs limits the 
estimation of educational production functions using cross-sectional data, as already noticed 
by Todd and Wolpin (2003). Therefore, the coefficients of the following model of an 
educational production function can only be interpreted as causal effects under certain 
assumptions, as will be explained below. 
(1) isSisisis DBT ευβββ ++++= 210   
Tis is the reading test score of student i in school s, Bis is a set of student background variables 
including student’s sex and age, parents‘ origin, education and attitude towards reading, the 
language spoken at home, the number of books at home, the school’s location and D 
comprises dummies for the grade levels. νs and εis are the error terms at the school and student 
level, respectively. The parameter vectors β0 to β2 are to be estimated using weighted cluster-
robust linear regressions (CRLR) with schools being clusters. The analysis refers only to 
reading literacy because it is the only proficiency that is tested in both PIRLS and PISA. 
Besides innate ability, which cannot be measured, the background of students has been 
shown to be the most decisive factor explaining student performance (cf. Hanushek and 
Luque, 2002; Woessmann, 2003b). The student background variables are unlikely to change 
much over time and are hence a good proxy also for prior inputs of student background. Their 
effect on the cognitive achievement of students can therefore be interpreted essentially as a 
causal relationship. In schooling systems in which the enrolment age is not strictly regulated 
but depends on the characteristics of students or parents, the grade level dummies in model 
(1) may be endogenous. Therefore, estimations using only one grade level will be performed 
as well. By including only variables on the student background and none on schools, we get 
the total effect of student background on performance. Any indirect effects of background on 
previous performance and school choice are included. 
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3.2 Relating educational opportunities to educational institutions 
Determining the role of institutions in international comparisons of schooling systems 
depends crucially on the assumption that one can control for country-specific differences such 
as cultural and social factors. It is however doubtful that traditional behavior and attitudes 
towards education can be grasped by standard variables. Instead, the strategy chosen here is to 
eliminate country-specific factors by combining a two-step procedure with a differencing out 
approach. First, not the level of educational opportunities but the changes between grade four 
and grade nine in educational opportunities are estimated for each country. In a second step, 
these changes are related to changes in institutions of the schooling systems. The intuition 
behind the estimation strategy is the following. When we consider the relationship between 
the share of students that attend private schools and the effect of parents’ education on student 
performance, we would expect a higher impact of parents’ education in countries in which we 
observe a large private school sector, given that private schools provide better schooling for 
students from a higher social background. Relating the effect of parents’ education to the size 
of the private school sector in lower secondary education would only show this relationship if 
there were no other differences between countries that could explain the size of the effect of 
parents’ education on student performance. Therefore, the estimation strategy relates the 
changes in the effect of parents’ education between grade four and grade nine to the changes 
in the size of the private school sector.4 In countries in which the size of the private school 
sector increases strongly between the two grades, we expect that the effect of parents’ 
education on student performance increases as well. However, in countries in which the 
importance of private schools is the same in grade four and grade nine, there should be no 
change in the effect of parents’ education, irrespective of the absolute size of the private 
school sector. The details of the estimation strategy are presented more formally below. 
 The first problem we face is that the two studies on which the analysis builds are not 
identical and the skills tested might differ slightly. If we assume that the PIRLS study is the 
reference study, the PISA test score is only an imperfect measure of what students would have 
achieved in a PIRLS-like test at grade nine. The educational production function for the 
‘true’, that is PIRLS-like test of students at grade 9, would be:  
(2) yiyiyyyi BT 9919099 ~
~~~~ εββ ++= . 
                                                          
4 ‘Grade nine’ refers to the PISA data and actually includes all 15 year-old students in grades eight, nine and ten. 
The estimations were also run only for students in grade nine to check for a possible selection bias due to the 
PISA sampling design (see sections 2.2 and 5.4).  
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The subscript 9 implies that students are tested in grade nine, y indicates the country and i the 
individual. The index for schools has been dropped for simplicity. However, we can only 
estimate the following equation using PISA data: 
(3) yiyiyiyyyi eBT +++= 9919099 ~~~ εββ  
We assume that (A1) yiB9 = yiB9
~ , i.e. the measures of student background are identical in 
PIRLS and PISA. The test score in PISA yiT9 , however, is only an imperfect measure of the 
‘true’ test score yiT9
~ . There is hence a measurement error yiyiyi TTe 99
~−= . The ‘true’ 
production function then can be written as: 
(4) yiyiyiyyyi eBT +++= 9919099 εββ  
In case the measurement error eyi is not related to student background B9yi, the coefficient β19y 
is unbiased and equals y19
~β . This might not be completely true because the difference in 
testing between the ‘true’ and the PISA test could e.g. favor a certain sex or native students 
compared to immigrant students. It is hence assumed that Cov (B9yi, eyi) ≠ 0 but rather small. 
A somewhat stricter assumption is (A2) Cov (B91i, e1i) = Cov (B92i, e2i) = …= Cov (B914i, e14i). 
This assumption implies that the correlation between student background and measurement 
error is identical across all countries. Since both studies are designed to be internationally 
comparable, the difference between the studies should not change across countries. Under 
assumption (A2), yy 1919
~βαβ = , with α being close to one.  
 In a second step, the estimated coefficient β19y is now explained by the institutional 
setting I in country y. For this estimation we have only one observation per country. 
(5) yyyy CI 9299190919 υγγγβ +++= , 
where Cy are unobservable country-specific factors such as culture, educational traditions and 
so forth. This or a similar equation is mostly estimated in previous studies, where Cy is either 
omitted or replaced by proxy variables such as GDP per capita. However, it is likely that 
schooling institutions are strongly linked to cultural background which can hardly be grasped 
by proxy variables, i.e. Cov (I9y,Cy)  ≠ 0. In this case γ19 is biased and we cannot observe the 
relationship between institutions and educational opportunities. In order to overcome this 
problem of omitted variables, we explain the differences in coefficients instead of the level of 
coefficients by changes in institutions. The difference-in-differences approach also controls 
for a difference in the correlation between student ability and student background across 
countries, as long as this correlation does not change differently over student age. Hence, the 
first step equation for students in grade four is subtracted from equation (5). 
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(6) yyyyyyyy CCII 49242941491904091419 υυγγγγγγββ −+−+−+−=−  
If we assume that the effects of the institutional factors Iy and unobservable country-specific 
factors Cy on educational opportunities do not change between grade four and grade nine, i.e. 
(A3) γ14 = γ19 and (A4) γ24 = γ29, we get     
(7) yyyyyy II 49491904091419 )( υυγγγββ −+−+−=− . 
Moreover, we have to assume that no anticipation effects take place, i.e. that institutional 
features in lower secondary education take effect already in primary education. Equation (7) 
is being estimated for those institutions on which we got information for primary and lower 
secondary education. For one institutional feature, the degree of school autonomy, 
information is only available for grade nine. Here, we have to assume that school autonomy is 
identical across all countries at grade four, i.e. (A5) I41 = I42 = … = I414. Hence, we can only 
exploit the variation in school autonomy at grade nine. Equation (7) then turns to      
(8) yyyyy I 4991901419 υυγδββ −++=− , 
where the intercept is δ0 = γ09 - γ04 - γ14 I4 . The coefficient of interest in equations (7) and (8) 
is γ19. The dependent variable β19y - β14y = yy 1419
~ ββα − is the change in educational 
opportunity between PIRLS and PISA. For each student background variable, we have one 
dependent variable that is regressed on the changes in one characteristic I of the schooling 
systems at a time. As the outcome variable of the second step is estimated in the first step, the 
second step regressions are weighted by the inverse of the standard error of the coefficient 
β19y - β14y (cf. Card and Krueger, 1992).5 So for each student background variable, there are 
separate regressions for each institutional variable, having a single observation for each 
country. The institutional variables are presented in part 5.  
The results are almost identical when assumption (A3) is relaxed. However, we loose 
a further degree of freedom in the second-step estimation and the estimates are less precise. 
Therefore, assumption (A3) is not relaxed in the estimations that are presented in the 
following section. In most countries considered in this analysis, the specific features of the 
schooling systems like streaming or a high share of private schools are introduced only after 
primary education. If this holds as well for the degree of school autonomy, assumption (A5) 
should hold. Under the assumption that country-specific factors do not change between the 
fourth and ninth/tenth grade except for the schooling system (A4), country-specific factors are 
largely eliminated by this estimation strategy. The results should be interpreted as 
                                                          
5 It would actually be preferable to estimate the two-step model in a system of equations using the minimum-
distance procedure. Since the two-step model serves only as an introduction to the preferred pooled model, the 
difference in methods is not decisive. 
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correlations, however, because the interaction effects may be determined by other observable 
and unobservable institutional variables as well, so that the estimate γ19 may be biased due to 
omitted variables. Unfortunately, this very data demanding estimation strategy leads to a low 
amount of observations in the second step, which leaves little room to explain the interaction 
effects by several institutional features.  
 The two steps of the previous model can be integrated into one pooled model. In this 
model, all interaction effects can be estimated within one model, which mitigates the potential 
problem of omitted variables. The preferred pooled model is the following: 
(9) yiyiyyyyi BIIPPPT υααααα +−++++= ))(( 4943210 . 
Here, all students i from all countries y are pooled in one regression. P is a dummy that is one 
for observations from the PISA data and zero otherwise. The country-specific intercepts for 
PIRLS are denoted by α0y, while α1yP allows for country-specific intercepts for PISA. The 
coefficient α2y measures the country-specific effect of student background, while α3 indicates 
the change in the impact of student background from grade four to grade nine/ten. Notice that 
α3 is not indexed by country. The cross-country variation that is spared is used to identify the 
interaction effects between student background and institutions. The coefficient of interest is 
α4, which expresses the difference in the coefficient of the student background variable 
resulting from a change of the institution variable I between PIRLS and PISA by one unit. 
Similarly to the two-step estimation approach, it is assumed that the changes in educational 
opportunities vary with certain features of the schooling institutions. Only those interaction 
effects with institutional variables are included in model (9) that are supported by theoretical 
considerations (see section 5.2 and Table 5). By including all interaction effects in the model 
we can mitigate the potential problem of omitted variables in the second step of the two-step 
approach, making the pooled model preferable to the two-step model. The institutional 
variables are only included in the interaction with student background variables and not as 
additional explanatory variables because we want to explain the total effect of student 
background on test scores, including any effect via institutions like school types. This total 
effect for each country is then explained by differences in institutions across countries as in 
the two-step approach. 
 Equation (9) is estimated using weighted cluster-robust linear regression. The schools 
and not the countries are chosen as clusters because country-specific intercepts for both 
PIRLS and PISA and country-specific effects of student background are included in this 
pooled model. This should be sufficient to control for heterogeneity across countries and 
unobserved country-effects. 
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4 The degree of equality of educational opportunity 
This section presents the estimates of student background effects on student performance, 
which serve as a proxy for educational opportunity here. Model (1) has been estimated 
separately for both datasets and each country. First the results from PIRLS for fourth-graders, 
then from PISA for ninth-/tenth-graders and finally the differences between the results are 
presented. 
4.1 Effects at the end of primary education 
Table 1 displays the estimates for the effect of student background variables on reading 
literacy, their significance-levels and the R² from the regressions.   
 
Table 1: Estimates for grade 4 (PIRLS) 
 CAN CZE DEU ENG FRA GRC HUN ISL ITA LVA NOR NZL RUS SWE
Female  16.83* 11.50* 10.42* 20.33* 8.23* 20.20* 13.47* 18.23* 7.52* 19.31* 22.08* 27.36* 12.87* 22.63*
Age  -9.53* -4.05 -15.42* 31.15* -25.51* 2.95 -17.14* 22.43* 12.52* -8.57* 25.72* 13.52‡ -5.62† 2.20 
Parents' origin  -1.68 -8.17† -12.35* -1.39 -6.01† -18.63* -12.42* -9.80† -17.00* 3.30 -5.01 0.05 -15.53* -12.28*
Language  -30.84* -24.27* -28.77* -42.21* -19.76* -10.96‡ -35.08* -29.94* -28.76* -16.93* -34.64* -47.20* -37.36* -27.62*
Books at home               
  26-100  2.31 15.24* 13.55* -6.52 12.07* 18.11* 18.49* 10.75† 9.49* 5.18 16.70† -3.08 7.96‡ 11.93*
  101-200  15.60* 33.75* 28.56* 18.16† 20.96* 27.26* 25.00* 29.21* 25.49* 12.69† 27.84* 19.27† 15.83* 16.03*
  >200  27.72* 39.00* 35.06* 26.88* 32.24* 39.77* 37.79* 25.80* 38.23* 11.90‡ 34.17* 31.44* 18.05* 20.80*
Parents‘ educ.               
Upper Second. 9.62‡ 17.11‡ 24.12* 21.48* 12.41* 18.37* 24.87* 21.31* 17.37* 21.04* 32.03* 17.72‡ 9.85 17.67*
  Post-Second. 21.02* 35.68* 18.29* 34.69* 26.32* 34.21* 29.00* 33.02* 12.09‡ 30.99* -- 40.86* 12.67‡ 26.93*
  University 51.80* 35.54* 33.61* 43.77* 34.23* 55.87* 52.26* 38.55* 28.36* 46.65* 51.27* 48.27* 30.17* 35.23*
School location               
  City  -1.29 12.75† -8.61† 2.53 5.08 14.15† 3.11 4.37 -2.29 8.25‡ 16.26† 15.86† 4.79 -0.66 
  Rural  -14.32* 0.89 -9.49 -3.81 7.70 9.45 -3.87 -6.47 -24.20† 6.67 7.58 -10.27 -- -0.91 
Parents‘ attit.               
  High  6.70* 4.84‡ 9.72* 17.76* 9.68* 15.89* 9.85* -5.06‡ 14.95* 10.77* 9.56† 26.54* 5.39† 6.23* 
  Low  -4.54 -7.32 3.65 2.70 -5.47 7.22 -1.74 -12.72‡ -0.08 -1.48 -3.57 -11.33 5.27 -9.25†
 R-Square 0.17 0.15 0.25 0.18 0.26 0.24 0.29 0.11 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.21 0.14 0.15 
Coefficients from cluster-robust linear regressions (CRLR), weighted by students‘sampling probabilities. 
Significance-levels:  * 1 percent, † 5 percent, ‡ 10 percent. Dependent variable: PIRLS reading literacy score. 
 
The estimated coefficients are highly significant for most variables and countries. Especially 
the effects of books at home and of the education of parents are of a high magnitude. The sign 
of the effects is as expected for all variables. The only significant counter-intuitive effect is a 
negative coefficient for a favorable attitude of parents in Iceland. The R-squared varies 
between 11 percent in Iceland and 29 percent in Hungary.  
The coefficients and their significance-levels of the regressions using only the 
observations with no imputed values are presented in Table A6. Few coefficients change the 
significance-level or sign and no signs of significant coefficients change in comparison to 
 16
Table 1. The R-squared is higher in most countries for the regressions using only the original 
data. 
4.2 Effects at lower secondary education 
Table 2 presents the estimates from the PISA study. Similarly to the former estimates, most 
coefficients are highly significant and are of the expected sign. Only the effect of parents’ 
origin is positive in three countries. The R-squared is consistently higher in all countries 
compared to the regressions for primary education, which could imply that student 
background has a higher effect on student performance in lower secondary than in primary 
education relative to other factors like innate ability. The R-squared ranges from 15 percent in 
Iceland to 52 percent in France. The higher values may also be partly due to differences in 
both what is measured and how it is measured in the two studies. 
 
Table 2: Estimates for grade 9/10 (PISA) 
 CAN CZE DEU ENG FRA GRC HUN ISL ITA LVA NOR NZL RUS SWE
Female  26.48* 21.11* 22.60* 23.99* 16.01* 33.23* 24.68* 35.41* 25.81* 42.63* 36.37* 39.64* 33.19* 29.69*
Age  -1.95 -27.44* -60.22* 17.61* 0.00 5.71 -35.24* 7.61 11.83* -27.90* 19.27* 29.14* -13.35† 15.70*
Parents' origin  2.74 7.47† 20.80‡ 2.44 -6.98* 5.56 -5.04 -8.88 16.21* -8.01 -9.24‡ 6.53‡ 3.11 0.79 
Language  -34.15* -16.73 -66.20* -45.67* -22.85* -38.84* -- -29.12† -30.38* -25.93† -30.68* -82.18* -4.42 -43.29*
Books at home               
  26-100  20.12* 24.25* 36.76* 27.60* 20.67* 22.00* 24.31* 15.76* 17.01* 7.49 22.67* 35.97* 16.83* 24.75*
  101-200  30.27* 40.01* 61.87* 52.24* 33.18* 33.32* 46.30* 33.89* 28.56* 32.24* 51.08* 57.04* 44.04* 38.77*
  >200  38.99* 60.09* 76.25* 63.13* 39.26* 47.77* 60.77* 47.65* 33.07* 42.48* 54.09* 68.15* 49.44* 61.49*
Parents‘ educ.               
Upper Second. -- 4.66 14.57† 9.43 8.79† 17.71* 24.90* 15.03* 12.44* 12.12 19.25* 19.39* 23.86† 12.78†
  Post-Second. -- 28.06* 39.38* 50.22* 14.17* 29.75* 53.12* 22.88* 20.99* 19.71† 9.69 40.11* 35.71* 18.38*
  University 19.07* 61.18* 40.32* 29.11* 8.13† 38.13* 78.73* 25.57* 26.78* 29.48* 13.61† 29.85* 43.07* 11.86†
School location               
  City  -- -0.47 -10.57 0.83 5.00 14.66‡ 19.94* -- 3.25 15.19‡ 4.13 19.12* 18.60† 3.44 
  Rural  -- -23.75* -16.65‡ -1.55 -0.62 -12.01 -26.42 -- 10.56 -28.14* -13.53* -11.88‡ -19.64† -4.99 
Parents‘ attit.               
  High  22.49* 9.51† 16.34* 31.24* 8.84* 6.01 7.31* 14.26* 1.68 11.01* 25.75* 15.13* 12.27* 13.10*
  Low  -27.02* -20.72* -9.14 -25.00* -13.79* -22.53* -13.29* -30.01* -23.50* -16.01* -38.92* -19.94* -15.55* -33.42*
 R-Square 0.21 0.31 0.41 0.20 0.51 0.25 0.42 0.15 0.28 0.28 0.19 0.25 0.23 0.23 
Coefficients from cluster-robust linear regressions (CRLR), weighted by students’ sampling probabilities. 
Dummies for grade levels are included in regressions. 
Significance-levels:  * 1 percent, † 5 percent, ‡ 10 percent. Dependent variable: PISA reading literacy score. 
 
Table A7 displays the coefficients for the original data without any imputed values. For some 
of the estimates the significance-level or sign changes compared to Table 2 but no signs of 
significant coefficients change. The R-squared are higher in the regression without imputed 
values for most countries. 
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4.3 Comparison of results 
This section compares the estimates of the educational production functions from the previous 
section in two ways. First, the effects will be aggregated and compared by a ranking of 
countries. Second, the individual interaction effects between PIRLS and PISA will be 
discussed.  
 Table 3 presents the sum of selected coefficients from the educational production 
functions, which constitute the difference in PIRLS / PISA test score points between students 
with an unfavorable and a favorable background. The countries are ranked by the estimates 
for PISA.  
 
Table 3: Difference in test score points between favorable and unfavorable student background 
Country PIRLS PISA PISA-PIRLS 
ITA 119.87 114.45 -5.42
FRA 100.47 116.48 16.01
CAN 128.87 165.46 36.59
RUS 113.98 174.47 60.49
ISL 122.32 190.90 68.58
GRC 145.43 192.96 47.53
SWE 118.56 197.05 78.49
LVA 91.49 203.69 112.20
CZE 118.48 205.62 87.14
HUN 151.02 216.24 65.22
ENG 134.58 217.25 82.67
NOR 147.17 222.19 75.02
DEU 120.21 226.70 106.49
NZL 154.22 260.24 106.02
Sum of coefficients = ‘female’-‘parents’origin’-‘language’+‘books>200’+‘university’. 
Countries are ranked by results for PISA. 
 
At grade four, student background has the lowest impact in Latvia and France and the highest 
in Hungary and New Zealand. The difference between the lowest and highest ranked 
countries amounts to 63 test score points. At grade eight/nine instead, the difference between 
the two countries at the extreme is 146 points. These countries are Italy with a very low 
impact of student background on PISA results and New Zealand again with a very high 
impact. The last column in Table 3 displays the difference between the two studies. Italy is 
the only country for which the aggregated effect of the selected student background variables 
decreases at grade eight/nine compared to grade four. In all other countries the impact 
increases strongly, most notably in Latvia, Germany and New Zealand.  
In the following, the results from the two studies are compared by presenting the 
interaction effects, which show how the effects of student background variables on student 
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performance – i.e. the educational opportunities - change between the end of primary and 
lower secondary education.  
 
Table 4: Differences in the effects of student background between grade four and grade nine/ten 
 CAN CZE DEU FRA GRC HUN ISL ITA LVA NOR NZL RUS SWE
Female  + + + + + + + + + + + + + 
Age  + - - +  - -  -  + + + 
Parents' origin   + +  +   + -   + + 
Language    -  -      - + - 
Books at home              
  26-100  + + + +       + + + 
  101-200  +  + +  +   + + + + + 
  >200  + + +   + +  + + + + + 
Parents‘ education             
  Upper Second.              
  Post-Second.   + -  +      +  
  University - +  - - + -   -   - 
School location              
  City       +        
  Rural   -      + - -  -  
Parents‘ attitude             
  High  +      + -  +  +  
  Low  -  -  -  - -  -  - - 
Signs reflect the difference in the impact of student background on performance between PIRLS and PISA that 
are significant at the 10 percent-significance-level. 
 
A plus in Table 4 indicates an increase in the coefficient β1 in equation (1) between PIRLS 
and PISA, which would imply a diminishing effect if the coefficient for PIRLS is negative. 
Looking at the characteristics of the students, the sex of students has a stronger positive 
impact on student reading performance in almost all countries. Girls have expanded their 
advantage compared to boys at grade nine/ten compared to grade four. Changes in the effect 
of age are not consistent across countries.  
The following variables indicate the social and cultural background of students. The 
positive signs for parents’ origin imply that a foreign born parent has a less negative or even 
positive impact on student performance at grade nine/ten. However, speaking a different 
language at home has a more negative effect in four countries. The number of books at home 
has gotten more important for student performance. This finding is consistent across almost 
all countries. Parents’ education has less impact on the performance of 15-year old students in 
seven countries, while the effect has increased in four countries. The effect of community 
location is apparently relatively constant across student age. A rural location has a stronger 
negative effect in four countries. The changes in the effect of parents’ attitude are fairly 
consistent across countries and depict a stronger impact on student performance. 
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The changes in the educational opportunities indicate that student characteristics and 
family background are getting more important for determining student performance in almost 
all countries. The equality of opportunity seems thus to decrease between primary and 
secondary education. However, the results also show that the attitude and interest of students 
and parents are becoming more influential (e.g. language spoken at home, books at home, 
parents’ attitude), while other factors are loosing their importance (e.g. parents’ origin and 
education). Therefore, the educational opportunities seem to increase for individuals with the 
right attitude towards education.  
As the two studies are not directly comparable, it remains unclear what part of the 
changes in the educational opportunities is due to differences between the studies and what 
changes really take place, though. The difference in the test design as well as the scaling of 
the test scores might cause a systematic greater dependence of test scores on student 
background in PISA compared to PIRLS. 6 Even then, the result that the structure of 
educational opportunities changes should hold because the systematic difference should affect 
all student background variables. The comparison of the two studies in section 2.4 showed 
that the definition of the background variables might differ between the studies, especially for 
parents’ education. The seemingly stricter definition of university education in PIRLS 
compared to PISA might at least partly explain the estimated negative signs in Table 4. 
5 The role of institutions 
This section aims at establishing the link between the institutional setting of the schooling 
systems and the former results on changes in the educational opportunities in the countries. 
First, the schooling systems of the different countries will be described according to certain 
criteria. Second, theoretical considerations on the link between schooling systems and 
educational opportunities will be pointed out before the empirical evidence will be presented.  
5.1 Schooling systems 
Although all countries except for Canada and New Zealand are European countries, their 
cultural background and population as well as their institutions may differ to a great degree. 
Moreover, the educational expenditures from the public and private side may differ. 
According to the general cultural background, the former socialist countries CZE, HUN, LVA 
and RUS, the Scandinavian countries NOR and SWE and the Western European countries 
                                                          
6 The hypothesis of a lower degree of equality is supported by the higher R-squared in the regressions at grade 
nine/ten than at grade four, which should be largely independent of the scaling of test scores but not of the test 
design. 
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DEU, FRA and ITA are likely to feature similar schooling systems. In the following, the 
countries will be described by the criteria schooling institutions, educational expenditures, 
and country and population.  
 Table A9 in the appendix presents some features of the national schooling systems and 
of educational expenditures as well as country and population facets. Although there is no 
obvious link between the general cultural background and the institutional setting, the figures 
point at similarities within the groups of countries mentioned above. The total intended 
instruction time per year is relatively low in the Scandinavian countries and in ISL. 
Furthermore, compulsory education is organized in a single structure system in these three 
countries and the PISA indices of school autonomy are comparatively high, which is 
consistent with the Nordic ´local control´ model of educational control (cf. Green et al., 1999, 
p. 91 et sqq.).  
In CZE, HUN and RUS lower secondary education is differentiated into two school 
types. Besides the single structure schools which are attended by most of the students, a low 
but growing number of students attends separated secondary schools (gymnazium) (cf. 
Anweiler et al., 1996, p. 21). The PISA index of school autonomy is high in CZE and HUN as 
well as the private education expenditures as share of total education expenditures. However, 
the rate of students in private schools is rather low in these countries. This ratio is remarkably 
high in France (21 percent), whereas the relative private education expenditures in France are 
about average. The high German figure is due to the vocational training in the dual system. In 
general, the parameter values of the Western European countries DEU, FRA and ITA do not 
point at similar schooling systems, in terms of e.g. the number of school types, the total 
intended instruction time or the offer of special language training for low achievers.  
 The dispersion of educational expenditures is relatively low, the expenditures on 
educational institutions as a percentage of GDP are higher than average in the Nordic 
countries, in France and in New Zealand. The country and population data indicate a higher 
female employment rate and also a tendency to a higher stock of foreign population in 
countries with a relatively high rate of urban population.  
5.2 Theoretical aspects 
This part describes the expected links between changes in educational opportunities and the 
school systems by making theoretical considerations and referring to the available literature. 
According to the estimation strategy outlined in section 3.2, changes in the impact of student 
background on student performance should be related to changes in schooling institutions. 
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Student characteristics 
The origin of students and the language spoken at home may be related to the support 
immigrant students receive at school. The differentiation of the schooling system could be 
linked to the effect of origin or language spoken at home. On the one hand, a grouping 
according to the ability of students could harm immigrant children because they are allocated 
to lower school types. On the other hand, if immigrant children are better supported in 
specialized schools, where teachers have more time to deal with their needs, a differentiated 
school system could have a beneficial effect for immigrant children. The relation between the 
interaction effect of being an immigrant and the number of school types is therefore 
ambiguous. 
 
Social background 
The social origin of students is indicated by the number of books at home and parental 
education. Social differentiation might be both reduced and increased by the use of streaming 
in lower secondary education, i.e. when students are allocated to different school types 
according to their ability. The direction of the link depends on whether school types for low 
achievers succeed in supporting these students and whether mobility between school types is 
sufficiently high. This is partly determined by peer effects, i.e. in how far which kind of 
students benefit from a more homogeneous or heterogeneous class composition. For a 
discussion of streaming in the literature see Heath (1984) or Slavin (1990). When access to 
higher school types depends on social background, students from a high social background 
are always advantaged because they have a wider choice of schools to attend. Especially when 
streaming takes place early in a child’s life, the effect should be great. Evidence for England 
supports the hypothesis that especially high ability students from a high social background 
benefit from streaming (Galindo-Rueda and Vignoles, 2004). Although private schools seem 
not to affect the performance of students on the average (Vandenberghe and Robin, 2004), 
they may offer a further mode of differentiation, by which children from a high social 
background benefit from possibly better private institutions. One factor which may reduce the 
effect of social origin is the time students spend in schools. Assuming that educational 
production takes place both at school and at home (cf. Todd and Wolpin, 2004), a high 
instruction time may limit the influence of the home production of education.  
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School location and parents’ attitude 
The school location effect may depend on the degree of differentiation of the schooling 
systems. In a system with many different school types and private schools, being a student in 
a rural area might have a negative effect because of the low accessibility of higher secondary 
schools in rural areas. However, this might also depend on the degree of urbanization in the 
country, so that an interaction effect between urbanization and differentiation of the school 
system might exist. There may also be a link between the autonomy of schools and school 
location because rural schools might suffer from a lack of resources and know how in the 
community, which might as well be the case for schools within large cities. 
Parents’ attitude towards their child’s educational success may be linked to several 
factors. A high instruction time might limit the influence of parents, while a higher autonomy 
of secondary schools may increase the possible effect on student performance. 
5.3 Empirical evidence  
In order to test the hypotheses stated above, we estimate the pooled model presented in 
equation (9). Moreover, the estimates of the second step of the two-step model shown in 
equation (7) are presented as additional evidence in the appendix. The features that are used to 
describe the institutional setting include the number of school types, instruction time, share of 
students that attend private schools and an index of autonomy of lower secondary schools and 
are presented in Table A9 in the appendix. Recall that no information is available on school 
autonomy in primary education. Therefore, we have to assume that school autonomy is 
identical across countries in primary education to get consistent estimates. 
Table 5 presents the estimates from equation (9), in which the changes in educational 
opportunities are interacted with the changes in institutional variables and are estimated in a 
pooled model including 12 countries.7 Only the interaction effects which test the stated 
hypotheses are included in the regression. The effect of 1.44 indicates that the impact of 
having more than 200 books at home increases by 1.44 test score points from grade four to 
grade nine/ten when the share of students in private schools increases by one percentage point 
between primary and lower secondary education. Although the sign of the effects can be 
reasonably interpreted it is difficult to compare and interpret the size of the effects due to 
possible differences between PIRLS and PISA test scores. The results indicate a positive 
relationship between the impact of parents’ origin and education and the number of school 
types. For language spoken at home, the link is negative. A higher instruction time is 
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associated with a lower impact of social background as indicated by the number of books at 
home. A higher degree of school autonomy is positively linked to the impact of a high 
parental attitude towards their child’s education. 
Table 5: Results from pooled model 
 School types 
Instruction 
time 
Share of 
students in 
private 
schools 
School 
autonomy 
Female      
Parents' origin  13.34*   (4.91)    
Language  -15.81*   (6.08)    
>200 Books at home  2.20   (2.96) 
-.002*   
(.0006) 
1.44‡ 
(.80)  
One parent univ. degree.  12.17*    (2.38) 
.0001   
(.0005) 
-.15 
(.66) 
 
School location     
City 5.59   (5.91)   
-3.67   
(3.05) 
Rural -4.83   (6.36)   
-1.18   
(3.28) 
Parents‘ attitude     
High  .0007   (.0007)  
3.22* 
(.99) 
Low  .0001   (.001)  
2.24   
(1.63) 
Significance-level:  * 1 percent. † 5 percent. ‡ 10 percent. Estimated using equation (9). 
 
Table A7 in the appendix presents the coefficients and standard errors from the two-step 
model. Each coefficient represents a separate regression. The regressions include between 10 
and 12 observations because Canada and England have been dropped since the data are not 
representative for the whole country. The low amount of observations is clearly a drawback of 
this estimation strategy, which is very data demanding. The results do not differ from the 
pooled model except for fewer significant effects. The estimates from non-parametric 
Nadaraya-Watson regressions of the interaction variables on institutional variables are 
presented in Figure A3. It serves as a graphical presentation of the link between the changes 
in educational opportunities and changes in schooling institutions but should be regarded 
cautiously because the amount of observations is too low for reliable non-parametric 
estimates, the estimator is sensitive to outliers and some regressors are not continuous.  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
7 Since the information on institutions is not always available for all countries, separate regressions were 
performed for those institutional variables with missing values, always including all possible interaction effects.  
 24
Table 6 now compares the theoretical hypotheses on the link between educational 
opportunities and the institutional setting and the empirical evidence from the two estimation 
approaches. All of the expected effects are either supported by the empirical evidence or the 
empirical evidence is ambiguous, i.e. the effects are insignificant. The two different models 
that have been estimated always lead to the same sign of the effect whenever the estimates are 
statistically significant. 
 
Table 6: Comparing theoretical hypotheses and empirical evidence on institutional effects 
Dependent variable 
explanatory variable 
Theoretical 
hypotheses 
Empirical 
evidence from 
two-step analysis
Empirical 
evidence from 
pooled estimation 
Parents' origin     
Number of school types Ambiguous Positive Positive 
Language    
Number of school types Ambiguous -- Negative 
Books at home    
Number of school types Positive -- -- 
Share of students in private schools Positive Positive Positive 
Total intended instruction time Negative -- Negative 
Parents‘ education     
Number of school types Positive Positive Positive 
Share of students in private schools Positive -- -- 
Total intended instruction time Negative -- -- 
Urban school location    
Number of school types Negative -- -- 
Autonomy of schools Ambiguous -- -- 
Rural school location    
Number of school types Negative -- -- 
Autonomy of schools Ambiguous -- -- 
Parents‘ attitude high    
Total intended instruction time Negative -- -- 
Autonomy of schools Positive -- Positive 
Parents‘ attitude low    
Total intended instruction time Positive -- -- 
Autonomy of schools Negative - -- 
Effects are significant at the 10 percent-significance-level. --: effects are insignificant.  
Theoretical hypotheses are based on section 5.2, empirical evidence on section 5.3. 
 
Unfortunately, much of the observed empirical evidence is not significant, which is probably 
partly due to the low number of countries for which data is available. The positive link 
between parents’ origin and the number of school types seems to indicate that immigrant 
children profit from a diversified school system. However, a diversified school system seems 
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to worsen the problems for children who speak a different language at home. Thus, only when 
integration takes place, immigrant children can benefit from a diversified school system.  One 
indicator of the social origin of students, parents’ education, is positively linked to the number 
of school types. More choice of schools seems to benefit socially advantaged students, who 
have easier access to better schools. This also holds for the size of the private school sector, 
which is positively linked to the effect of books at home. The influence of parents seems to be 
limited by the time students spend in school, which follows from the theoretical discussion. 
Greater school autonomy is associated with a stronger absolute effect of positive parental 
attitude. Hence, school autonomy increases the possibility of parents to positively influence 
their child’s school performance. 
5.4 Robustness tests 
Since the number of observations is very low and the results are hence likely to depend on 
single observations and might not be very robust, several tests for robustness have been 
performed using mainly the pooled model. 8 First, all regressions have been repeated using 
only the original data and not the imputed values. The number of observations in the pooled 
model then drops from 102,006 to 73,338. Two of the six formerly significant effects turn 
insignificant. These are the interaction effects between school types and language and number 
of books at home and private school sector. 
Second, the two-step model has been estimated for three different values of the 
parameter α, 0.8, 1 and 1.2, which indicate the correlation between the ‘true’ PIRLS-like test 
for students in grade nine and the observed PISA test scores. The results are very similar for 
different values of α. Only the level of significance changes slightly in some cases. 
 Third, the pooled model has also been estimated including Canada and England where 
possible, i.e. whenever information on institutions is available. The results are almost 
identical to those shown in Table 5. The size of some coefficients changes slightly but both 
significance level and direction of the effects stay constant.    
 Fourth, the pooled model has been estimated using only students in grade four and 
grade nine or ten. Before, students from the PISA study could be in grade eight, nine or ten. 
The equations have been estimated using grade level dummies. However, depending on the 
school enrolment criteria, the grade level dummies might be endogenous in the equations and 
lead to biased estimates of educational opportunities. Therefore, only students from the most 
frequented grade level have been kept and the analysis was performed with this restricted 
                                                          
8 Tables presenting the results for the robustness checks are available from the author upon request. 
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sample. The results are again very similar and no changes in significance levels or signs 
occur. 
Fifth, the discrete variable on the number of school types has been replaced by a 
dummy which indicates whether countries use streaming in lower secondary schooling or not. 
The school type variable was defined in such a way that is represents the degree of streaming 
that is applied in the countries. Of course, this is difficult to assess and may be object to 
measurement error. The dummy variable allows for less variation between countries but can 
be defined more clearly. The results reinforce the presented evidence.  
Overall, the results are very robust in spite of the few observations and the vague 
definitions of institutions like the degree of streaming. Only one of the five robustness tests 
leads to slightly different results, in which two effects turn insignificant. All other effects are 
always supported by all specifications. 
6 Conclusion 
Intergenerational mobility of human capital is largely determined by educational opportunities 
of students. Therefore, creating equal opportunities should be a main aim for policy-makers 
and could prevent from costly redistribution later on. The schooling systems and their 
institutional framework are a key factor for promoting equality of opportunity in education. 
This paper tries to explain cross-country differences in educational opportunities by analyzing 
the link between the institutional setting of schooling systems and educational opportunities. 
The estimation strategy, which exploits the information of changes in educational 
opportunities between two stages in a student’s schooling career and differences in the 
institutional setting across countries and between primary and lower secondary education, 
controls largely for country-specific factors that invalidate other cross-country comparisons of 
institutional effects on student performance. 
The empirical analysis builds on the international PIRLS and PISA studies on reading 
literacy. A comparison of the studies indicates that differences in mean scores are negatively 
linked to differences in standard deviations, i.e. an increase in mean scores is associated with 
a decrease in the spread of scores. The estimation of the effects of student background on 
student performance shows that the absolute effect of gender, the amount of books at home, 
the school location and parents‘ attitude increases between the end of primary and lower 
secondary education, while the effect of parents’ origin and education seems to decrease.  
The equality of opportunity seems to decrease between primary and secondary 
education because the impact of student background variables is higher at grade nine/ten than 
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at grade four in almost all countries. However, the results show that the attitude and interest of 
students and parents are becoming more influential, while other factors are loosing their 
importance. Therefore, educational opportunities seem to increase for individuals with the 
right attitude towards education. This finding should hold even if the two studies differ and 
the overall dependence on student background is greater in the PISA compared to the PIRLS 
study only due to the design of the study. For parents’ education, a difference in definitions 
may partly explain the observed pattern. 
It can be shown that institutions play a role in determining the educational 
opportunities of students. The evidence on the link between institutions and changes in 
educational opportunities is in line with theoretical hypotheses, whenever it is significant. The 
social origin of students, measured by the number of books at home and parental education, 
increases its effect on student performance in countries with a differentiated schooling system 
with several school types and a large private school sector. This supports the hypothesis that 
streaming and private schools benefit the performance of students from a better social 
background. The time students spend in schools seems to limit the effect of social origin upon 
student performance while higher school autonomy is associated with higher parental 
influence.  
The results imply that schooling institutions can affect the equality of educational 
opportunities of students and have hence an impact on the intergenerational mobility of 
human capital. According to the findings, educational opportunities could be increased by a 
low differentiation of lower secondary education, a low share of private schools and a 
relatively high instruction time for example. School autonomy can have both a negative and a 
positive effect on student performance, which depends on the attitude of parents. However, 
these suggestions are based on findings of correlations and not of causal effects and should 
therefore be taken cautiously. Moreover, the effects of schooling institutions depend always 
on the implementation of policies within individual countries, which can hardly be measured. 
The research has shown that little is known on the comparability of student 
performance studies so far. This knowledge would help to exploit further information from 
the available studies. Moreover, further research is needed in establishing a causal 
relationship between institutional framework and educational opportunities. Comparable data 
on the schooling systems of a higher number of countries is needed as well. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: Participation of students and schools in PIRLS and PISA 
 CAN CZE DEU ENG FRA GRC HUN ISL ITA LVA NOR NZL RUS SWE
PIRLS      
Number of 
students 8,177 3,005 7,515 3,126 3,503 2,478 4,650 3,635 3,502 3,014 3,388 2,458 4,092 6,027
Number of 
schools 204 141 211 131 145 145 216 133 184 140 136 156 206 146
PISA 
Number of 
students 29,005 5,170 4,981 9,228 4,642 4,580 4,808 3,193 4,782 3,842 4,062 3,632 6,686 4,362
Number of 
schools 1,118 221 220 363 178 158 195 131 173 155 177 154 247 155
 
Table A2: Means and standard deviations of the data including imputed values 
 CAN CZE DEU ENG FRA GRC HUN ISL ITA LVA NOR NZL RUS SWE
Scores          
PIRLS 544.7 (67.7) 
537.2 
(60.6) 
539.7 
(63.2) 
553.3 
(82.8) 
525.9
(66.1) 
524.7
(69.2) 
543.6
(61.8) 
513.2
(70.7) 
540.7
(67.0) 
544.7
(57.9) 
500.3 
(77.1) 
530.2 
(89.2) 
527.9 
(62.7) 
561.1
(61.6) 
PISA 536.4 (90.5) 
501.0 
(83.1) 
485.1 
(108.3) 
524.5
(97.2) 
505.2
(88.7)
474.7
(93.8) 
481.3
(90.3) 
510.7
(87.1) 
490.5
(86.9) 
459.1
(98.7) 
507.4 
(99.2) 
530.4 
(104.1) 
462.0
(88.8) 
517.0
(88.6) 
Student Background 
Variables 
             
PIRLS               
Female  0.50 (0.50) 
0.49 
(0.50) 
0.50 
(0.50) 
0.52 
(0.50) 
0.49
(0.50)
0.50
(0.50) 
0.51
(0.50) 
0.50
(0.50) 
0.48
(0.50) 
0.48
(0.50) 
0.48 
(0.50) 
0.49 
(0.50) 
0.49 
(0.50) 
0.49
(0.50) 
Age  10.02 (0.41) 
10.51 
(0.45) 
10.54 
(0.50) 
10.21
(0.30) 
10.12
(0.50)
9.95
(0.44) 
10.67
(0.52) 
9.72
(0.29) 
9.85
(0.37) 
11.05
(0.48) 
9.97 
(0.33) 
10.05 
(0.36) 
10.28
(0.63) 
10.80
(0.32) 
Parents' origin  0.35 (0.48) 
0.11 
(0.32) 
0.23 
(0.42) 
0.32 
(0.47) 
0.28
(0.45)
0.19
(0.39) 
0.06
(0.24) 
0.12
(0.33) 
0.11
(0.32) 
0.33
(0.47) 
0.17 
(0.38) 
0.38 
(0.49) 
0.23 
(0.42) 
0.24
(0.43) 
Language  0.16 (0.37) 
0.07 
(0.25) 
0.10 
(0.30) 
0.12 
(0.32) 
0.13
(0.34)
0.06
(0.23) 
0.04
(0.21) 
0.11
(0.32) 
0.04
(0.19) 
0.08
(0.28) 
0.08 
(0.27) 
0.16 
(0.37) 
0.15 
(0.35) 
0.10
(0.30) 
Books at home               
  < 11 0.05 (0.22) 
0.01 
(0.11) 
0.06 
(0.23) 
0.04 
(0.19) 
0.10 
(0.29)
0.09 
(0.29) 
0.04 
(0.20) 
0.01 
(0.11) 
0.11 
(0.32) 
0.03 
(0.17) 
0.02 
(0.13) 
0.05 
(0.22) 
0.10 
(0.30) 
0.03 
(0.17) 
  11-25  0.10 (0.30) 
0.07 
(0.25) 
0.11 
(0.31) 
0.06 
(0.24) 
0.13
(0.34)
0.14
(0.35) 
0.07
(0.25) 
0.04
(0.21) 
0.20
(0.40) 
0.07
(0.25) 
0.05 
(0.22) 
0.10 
(0.29) 
0.16 
(0.37) 
0.06
(0.24) 
  26-100  0.48 (0.50) 
0.42 
(0.49) 
0.42 
(0.49) 
0.63 
(0.48) 
0.40
(0.49)
0.51
(0.50) 
0.27
(0.44) 
0.23
(0.42) 
0.38
(0.49) 
0.32
(0.47) 
0.25 
(0.43) 
0.45 
(0.50) 
0.36 
(0.48) 
0.24
(0.43) 
  101-200  0.17 (0.37) 
0.21 
(0.41) 
0.16 
(0.36) 
0.12 
(0.32) 
0.16
(0.36)
0.12
(0.32) 
0.21
(0.41) 
0.22
(0.41) 
0.13
(0.34) 
0.21
(0.41) 
0.20 
(0.40) 
0.17 
(0.37) 
0.17 
(0.38) 
0.20
(0.40) 
  >200  0.20 (0.40) 
0.29 
(0.45) 
0.26 
(0.44) 
0.16 
(0.36) 
0.22
(0.41)
0.14
(0.35) 
0.41
(0.49) 
0.50
(0.50) 
0.16
(0.37) 
0.37
(0.48) 
0.48 
(0.50) 
0.24 
(0.42) 
0.21 
(0.41) 
0.46
(0.50) 
Parents‘ educ.               
  No Second. 0.03 (0.16) 
0.03 
(0.18) 
0.09 
(0.28) 
0.65 
(0.48) 
0.42 
(0.49)
0.14 
(0.35) 
0.08 
(0.28) 
0.11 
(0.32) 
0.29 
(0.46) 
0.04 
(0.28) 
0.03 
(0.16) 
0.03 
(0.18) 
0.04 
(0.19) 
0.06 
(0.23) 
  Upper Second. 0.24 (0.42) 
0.69 
(0.46) 
0.20 
(0.40) 
0.09 
(0.28) 
0.16
(0.37)
0.39
(0.49) 
0.57
(0.49) 
0.36
(0.48) 
0.48
(0.50) 
0.37
(0.48) 
0.42 
(0.49) 
0.39 
(0.49) 
0.26 
(0.44) 
0.34
(0.48) 
  Post-Second. 0.46 (0.50) 
0.06 
(0.24) 
0.46 
(0.50) 
0.02 
(0.13) 
0.13
(0.33)
0.19
(0.39) 
0.03
(0.17) 
0.08
(0.28) 
0.04
(0.18) 
0.31
(0.46) --- 
0.18 
(0.39) 
0.43 
(0.49) 
0.21
(0.41) 
  University 0.26 (0.44) 
0.21 
(0.41) 
0.24 
(0.43) 
0.20 
(0.40) 
0.21
(0.41)
0.20
(0.40) 
0.31
(0.46) 
0.44
(0.50) 
0.17
(0.38) 
0.28
(0.45) 
0.55 
(0.50) 
0.38 
(0.48) 
0.27 
(0.44) 
0.39
(0.49) 
School location               
  City  0.35 (0.48) 
0.15 
(0.36) 
0.23 
(0.42) 
0.30 
(0.46) 
0.15
(0.35)
0.29
(0.45) 
0.33
(0.47) 
0.27
(0.45) 
0.16
(0.37) 
0.42
(0.49) 
0.19 
(0.39) 
0.45 
(0.50) 
0.39 
(0.49) 
0.16
(0.37) 
  Town 0.56 0.73 0.75 0.68 0.78 0.66 0.62 0.60 0.80 0.51 0.66 0.46 0.61 0.77 
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(0.50) (0.44) (0.43) (0.47) (0.41) (0.47) (0.48) (0.49) (0.40) (0.50) (0.47) (0.50) (0.49) (0.42) 
  Rural  0.09 (0.28) 
0.11 
(0.31) 
0.01 
(0.12) 
0.02 
(0.14) 
0.07
(0.26)
0.05
(0.21) 
0.05
(0.21) 
0.13
(0.34) 
0.04
(0.19) 
0.07
(0.25) 
0.15 
(0.36) 
0.09 
(0.28) --- 
0.07
(0.25) 
Parents‘ attit.               
  High  0.70 (0.46) 
0.69 
(0.46) 
0.52 
(0.50) 
0.82 
(0.38) 
0.48
(0.50)
0.68
(0.47) 
0.75
(0.43) 
0.72
(0.45) 
0.57
(0.50) 
0.48
(0.50) 
0.76 
(0.43) 
0.70 
(0.46) 
0.51 
(0.50) 
0.74
(0.42) 
  Medium 0.27 (0.45) 
0.28 
(0.45) 
0.39 
(0.49) 
0.14 
(0.35) 
0.48 
(0.50)
0.27 
(0.44) 
0.23 
(0.43) 
0.25 
(0.43) 
0.38 
(0.48) 
0.50 
(0.50) 
0.21 
(0.41) 
0.26 
(0.44) 
0.45 
(0.50) 
0.22 
(0.41) 
  Low  0.03 (0.17) 
0.03 
(0.18) 
0.09 
(0.28) 
0.03 
(0.17) 
0.04
(0.19)
0.05
(0.22) 
0.02
(0.15) 
0.03
(0.16) 
0.06
(0.23) 
0.02
(0.15) 
0.04 
(0.19) 
0.04 
(0.20) 
0.05 
(0.21) 
0.05
(0.21) 
PISA               
Female  0.50 (0.50) 
0.53 
(0.50) 
0.50 
(0.50) 
0.50 
(0.50) 
0.51
(0.50)
0.50
(0.50) 
0.50
(0.50) 
0.51
(0.50) 
0.50
(0.50) 
0.51
(0.50) 
0.49 
(0.50) 
0.50 
(0.50) 
0.50 
(0.50) 
0.49
(0.50) 
Age  15.79 (0.28) 
15.72 
(0.28) 
15.70 
(0.28) 
15.62
(0.29) 
15.79
(0.28)
15.70
(0.27) 
15.71
(0.28) 
15.63
(0.28) 
15.72
(0.28) 
15.72
(0.28) 
15.73 
(0.28) 
15.70 
(0.28) 
15.70
(0.28) 
15.72
(0.28) 
Parents' origin  0.31 (0.46) 
0.08 
(0.27) 
0.21 
(0.40) 
0.18 
(0.38) 
0.25
(0.43)
0.10
(0.31) 
0.04
(0.19) 
0.06
(0.24) 
0.05
(0.22) 
0.39
(0.49) 
0.11 
(0.31) 
0.36 
(0.48) 
0.13 
(0.34) 
0.21
(0.41) 
Language  0.13 (0.34) 
0.01 
(0.12) 
0.16 
(0.37) 
0.05 
(0.22) 
0.08
(0.27)
0.04
(0.19) --- 
0.02
(0.15) 
0.22
(0.41) 
0.09
(0.28) 
0.13 
(0.33) 
0.14 
(0.35) 
0.08 
(0.27) 
0.10
(0.30) 
Books at home               
  < 11 0.06 (0.24) 
0.02 
(0.16) 
0.08 
(0.27) 
0.08 
(0.28) 
0.11 
(0.31)
0.11 
(0.31) 
0.04 
(0.21) 
0.03 
(0.17) 
0.09 
(0.29) 
0.04 
(0.19) 
0.06 
(0.24) 
0.06 
(0.24) 
0.07 
(0.25) 
0.06 
(0.23) 
  11-25  0.18 (0.38) 
0.11 
(0.32) 
0.20 
(0.40) 
0.21 
(0.41) 
0.23
(0.42)
0.30
(0.46) 
0.13
(0.34) 
0.11
(0.31) 
0.21
(0.41) 
0.10
(0.30) 
0.13 
(0.34) 
0.18 
(0.38) 
0.17 
(0.37) 
0.14
(0.35) 
  26-100  0.20 (0.40) 
0.21 
(0.41) 
0.22 
(0.41) 
0.21 
(0.41) 
0.21
(0.41)
0.26
(0.44) 
0.19
(0.39) 
0.20
(0.40) 
0.23
(0.42) 
0.19
(0.39) 
0.18 
(0.39) 
0.21 
(0.41) 
0.20 
(0.40) 
0.18
(0.39) 
  101-200  0.24 (0.43) 
0.28 
(0.45) 
0.21 
(0.41) 
0.21 
(0.40) 
0.20
(0.40)
0.16
(0.37) 
0.22
(0.41) 
0.25
(0.43) 
0.21
(0.41) 
0.27
(0.44) 
0.23 
(0.42) 
0.23 
(0.42) 
0.22 
(0.41) 
0.24
(0.43) 
  >200  0.32 (0.47) 
0.37 
(0.48) 
0.29 
(0.45) 
0.29 
(0.45) 
0.24
(0.43)
0.16
(0.37) 
0.42
(0.49) 
0.41
(0.49) 
0.27
(0.44) 
0.41
(0.49) 
0.39 
(0.49) 
0.32 
(0.47) 
0.34 
(0.47) 
0.37
(0.48) 
Parents‘ educ.               
  No Second. 0.06 (0.24) 
0.01 
(0.10) 
0.05 
(0.22) 
0.06 
(0.24) 
0.15 
(0.35)
0.15 
(0.35) 
0.06 
(0.23) 
0.12 
(0.32) 
0.27 
(0.44) 
0.03 
(0.17) 
0.06 
(0.24) 
0.05 
(0.21) 
0.02 
(0.15) 
0.06 
(0.24) 
  Upper Second. --- 0.30 (0.46) 
0.46 
(0.50) 
0.33 
(0.47) 
0.20
(0.40)
0.05
(0.21) 
0.31
(0.46) 
0.25
(0.44) 
0.12
(0.33) 
0.03
(0.17) 
0.13 
(0.33) 
0.25 
(0.43) 
0.02 
(0.14) 
0.08
(0.26) 
  Post-Second. 0.26 (0.44) 
0.45 
(0.50) 
0.09 
(0.29) 
0.08 
(0.26) 
0.13
(0.34)
0.23
(0.42) 
0.35
(0.48) 
0.20
(0.40) 
0.36
(0.48) 
0.49
(0.50) 
0.19 
(0.40) 
0.06 
(0.25) 
0.51 
(0.50) 
0.22
(0.41) 
  University 0.67 (0.47) 
0.24 
(0.43) 
0.38 
(0.49) 
0.52 
(0.50) 
0.49
(0.50)
0.45
(0.50) 
0.28
(0.45) 
0.37
(0.48) 
0.21
(0.41) 
0.44
(0.50) 
0.60 
(0.49) 
0.63 
(0.48) 
0.44 
(0.50) 
0.63
(0.48) 
School location               
  City  --- 0.30 (0.46) 
0.21 
(0.41) 
0.33 
(0.47) 
0.17
(0.38)
0.32
(0.47) 
0.42
(0.49) --- 
0.29
(0.46) 
0.30
(0.46) 
0.11 
(0.31) 
0.46 
(0.50) 
0.37 
(0.48) 
0.17
(0.38) 
  Town --- 0.61 (0.49) 
0.72 
(0.45) 
0.60 
(0.49) 
0.77 
(0.42)
0.63 
(0.48) 
0.56 
(0.50) --- 
0.69 
(0.46) 
0.49 
(0.50) 
0.51 
(0.50) 
0.42 
(0.49) 
0.32 
(0.47) 
0.61 
(0.49) 
  Rural  --- 0.09 (0.28) 
0.06 
(0.25) 
0.08 
(0.27) 
0.06
(0.23)
0.05
(0.21) 
0.02
(0.15) --- 
0.02
(0.14) 
0.20
(0.40) 
0.39 
(0.49) 
0.13 
(0.33) 
0.31 
(0.46) 
0.22
(0.41) 
Parents‘ attit.               
  High  0.15 (0.36) 
0.09 
(0.29) 
0.09 
(0.28) 
0.13 
(0.33) 
0.20
(0.40)
0.15
(0.36) 
0.23
(0.42) 
0.17
(0.38) 
0.27
(0.44) 
0.22
(0.41) 
0.10 
(0.29) 
0.15 
(0.36) 
0.22 
(0.42) 
0.09
(0.29) 
  Medium 0.70 (0.46) 
0.69 
(0.46) 
0.71 
(0.45) 
0.74 
(0.44) 
0.70 
(0.46)
0.74 
(0.44) 
0.67 
(0.47) 
0.67 
(0.47) 
0.63 
(0.48) 
0.66 
(0.47) 
0.68 
(0.46) 
0.70 
(0.46) 
0.63 
(0.48) 
0.71 
(0.45) 
  Low  0.15 (0.35) 
0.21 
(0.41) 
0.20 
(0.40) 
0.14 
(0.34) 
0.10
(0.30)
0.11
(0.31) 
0.09
(0.29) 
0.16
(0.36) 
0.10
(0.30) 
0.12
(0.32) 
0.22 
(0.41) 
0.15 
(0.36) 
0.15 
(0.36) 
0.19
(0.40) 
Values are weighted by the sampling probability of the students. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. 
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Table A3: Means and standard deviations of the data without imputed values 
 CAN CZE DEU ENG FRA GRC HUN ISL ITA LVA NOR NZL RUS SWE
Scores          
PIRLS 555.8 (65.3) 
546.1 
(57.2) 
547.9 
(61.8) 
576.0 
(82.0) 
534.9
(63.4) 
537.8
(63.6) 
557.4
(57.3) 
519.6
(69.4) 
546.8
(65.6) 
562.1
(51.6) 
507.7 
(76.0) 
538.5
(87.4) 
543.0 
(58.3) 
564.5
(61.2) 
PISA 501.2 (106) 
504.6 
(81.1) 
512.4 
(90.7) 
537.7
(92.4) 
516.2
(83.2)
479.2
(91.3) 
482.0
(86.6) 
511.2
(86.8) 
497.2
(83.9) 
469.2
(95.9) 
517.2 
(94.5) 
550.6 
(96.0) 
468.9
(86.7) 
523.0
(86.0) 
Student background 
variables 
             
PIRLS               
Female  0.50 (0.50) 
0.49 
(0.50) 
0.50 
(0.50) 
0.52 
(0.50) 
0.49
(0.50)
0.50
(0.50) 
0.51
(0.50) 
0.50
(0.50) 
0.48
(0.50) 
0.48
(0.50) 
0.48 
(0.50) 
0.49 
(0.50) 
0.49 
(0.50) 
0.49
(0.50) 
Age  10.02 (0.41) 
10.51 
(0.45) 
10.54 
(0.50) 
10.21
(0.30) 
10.12
(0.50)
9.95
(0.44) 
10.67
(0.52) 
9.72
(0.29) 
9.85
(0.37) 
11.05
(0.48) 
9.97 
(0.33) 
10.05 
(0.36) 
10.28
(0.63) 
10.80
(0.32) 
Parents' origin  0.39 (0.49) 
0.12 
(0.32) 
0.25 
(0.43) 
0.33 
(0.47) 
0.30
(0.46)
0.19
(0.39) 
0.07
(0.25) 
0.13
(0.34) 
0.12
(0.32) 
0.35
(0.48) 
0.18 
(0.38) 
0.41 
(0.49) 
0.24 
(0.43) 
0.24
(0.43) 
Language  0.16 (0.37) 
0.07 
(0.25) 
0.10 
(0.31) 
0.12 
(0.32) 
0.13
(0.34)
0.06
(0.24) 
0.04
(0.21) 
0.12
(0.32) 
0.04
(0.19) 
0.09
(0.28) 
0.08 
(0.28) 
0.16 
(0.37) 
0.15 
(0.35) 
0.10
(0.30) 
Books at home               
  < 11 0.06 (0.24) 
0.01 
(0.12) 
0.06 
(0.24) 
0.07 
(0.25) 
0.10 
(0.30)
0.10 
(0.30) 
0.04 
(0.20) 
0.01 
(0.11) 
0.12 
(0.32) 
0.03 
(0.18) 
0.02 
(0.14) 
0.06 
(0.24) 
0.10 
(0.30) 
0.03 
(0.18) 
  11-25  0.12 (0.33) 
0.08 
(0.26) 
0.12 
(0.33) 
0.11 
(0.31) 
0.14
(0.35)
0.16
(0.37) 
0.07
(0.26) 
0.05
(0.22) 
0.21
(0.41) 
0.07
(0.26) 
0.05 
(0.23) 
0.11 
(0.32) 
0.16 
(0.37) 
0.07
(0.25) 
  26-100  0.37 (0.48) 
0.37 
(0.48) 
0.36 
(0.48) 
0.34 
(0.47) 
0.35
(0.48)
0.44
(0.50) 
0.27
(0.44) 
0.27
(0.44) 
0.36
(0.48) 
0.32
(0.47) 
0.26 
(0.44) 
0.35 
(0.48) 
0.35 
(0.48) 
0.25
(0.43) 
  101-200  0.20 (0.40) 
0.24 
(0.42) 
0.18 
(0.38) 
0.21 
(0.41) 
0.17
(0.38)
0.13
(0.34) 
0.22
(0.40) 
0.26
(0.44) 
0.14
(0.35) 
0.23
(0.42) 
0.22 
(0.42) 
0.21 
(0.40) 
0.17 
(0.38) 
0.22
(0.42) 
  >200  0.24 (0.43) 
0.30 
(0.46) 
0.27 
(0.45) 
0.28 
(0.45) 
0.23
(0.42)
0.16
(0.37) 
0.40
(0.49) 
0.40
(0.49) 
0.17
(0.38) 
0.35
(0.48) 
0.45 
(0.50) 
0.28 
(0.45) 
0.21 
(0.41) 
0.42
(0.50) 
Parents‘ educ.               
  No Second. 0.03 (0.18) 
0.04 
(0.20) 
0.12 
(0.32) 
0.35 
(0.48) 
0.31 
(0.46)
0.17 
(0.37) 
0.08 
(0.28) 
0.13 
(0.34) 
0.30 
(0.46) 
0.05 
(0.21) 
0.03 
(0.17) 
0.04 
(0.20) 
0.04 
(0.19) 
0.06 
(0.24) 
  Upper Second. 0.26 (0.44) 
0.66 
(0.47) 
0.23 
(0.42) 
0.17 
(0.38) 
0.20
(0.40)
0.28
(0.45) 
0.57
(0.50) 
0.42
(0.49) 
0.46
(0.50) 
0.35
(0.48) 
0.44 
(0.49) 
0.34 
(0.47) 
0.27 
(0.44) 
0.36
(0.48) 
  Post-Second. 0.37 (0.48) 
0.07 
(0.26) 
0.36 
(0.48) 
0.03 
(0.18) 
0.16
(0.37)
0.23
(0.42) 
0.03
(0.18) 
0.10
(0.30) 
0.04
(0.19) 
0.34
(0.47) --- 
0.22 
(0.42) 
0.42 
(0.49) 
0.23
(0.42) 
  University 0.32 (0.47) 
0.22 
(0.42) 
0.27 
(0.44) 
0.36 
(0.48) 
0.23
(0.42)
0.23
(0.42) 
0.30
(0.46) 
0.33
(0.47) 
0.18
(0.38) 
0.26
(0.44) 
0.53 
(0.50) 
0.37 
(0.48) 
0.27 
(0.44) 
0.35
(0.48) 
School location               
  City  0.37 (0.48) 
0.19 
(0.39) 
0.31 
(0.46) 
0.38 
(0.49) 
0.21
(0.41)
0.38
(0.48) 
0.42
(0.49) 
0.35
(0.48) 
0.16
(0.37) 
0.44
(0.50) 
0.24 
(0.43) 
0.45 
(0.50) 
0.56 
(0.50) 
0.19
(0.40) 
  Town 0.53 (0.50) 
0.69 
(0.47) 
0.66 
(0.47) 
0.59 
(0.49) 
0.69 
(0.46)
0.56 
(0.50) 
0.52 
(0.50) 
0.47 
(0.50) 
0.80 
(0.40) 
0.45 
(0.50) 
0.56 
(0.50) 
0.44 
(0.50) 
0.44 
(0.50) 
0.73 
(0.44) 
  Rural  0.10 (0.30) 
0.14 
(0.35) 
0.02 
(0.14) 
0.03 
(0.17) 
0.10
(0.30)
0.06
(0.24) 
0.06
(0.24) 
0.18
(0.39) 
0.04
(0.19) 
0.11
(0.31) 
0.20 
(0.40) 
0.11 
(0.31) --- 
0.08
(0.27) 
Parents‘ attit.               
  High  0.64 (0.48) 
0.64 
(0.48) 
0.55 
(0.50) 
0.69 
(0.46) 
0.53
(0.50)
0.64
(0.48) 
0.74
(0.44) 
0.67
(0.47) 
0.56
(0.50) 
0.48
(0.50) 
0.73 
(0.44) 
0.65 
(0.48) 
0.51 
(0.50) 
0.71
(0.45) 
  Medium 0.32 (0.47) 
0.32 
(0.47) 
0.35 
(0.48) 
0.26 
(0.44) 
0.43 
(0.50)
0.31 
(0.46) 
0.23 
(0.43) 
0.30 
(0.46) 
0.37 
(0.48) 
0.50 
(0.50) 
0.23 
(0.42) 
0.30 
(0.46) 
0.45 
(0.50) 
0.24 
(0.43) 
  Low  0.04 (0.19) 
0.04 
(0.20) 
0.10 
(0.30) 
0.06 
(0.23) 
0.04
(0.21)
0.06
(0.23) 
0.03
(0.16) 
0.03
(0.18) 
0.07
(0.25) 
0.03
(0.16) 
0.04 
(0.20) 
0.05 
(0.22) 
0.05 
(0.22) 
0.05
(0.22) 
PISA               
Female  0.50 (0.50) 
0.53 
(0.50) 
0.50 
(0.50) 
0.50 
(0.50) 
0.51
(0.50)
0.50
(0.50) 
0.50
(0.50) 
0.51
(0.50) 
0.50
(0.50) 
0.51
(0.50) 
0.49 
(0.50) 
0.50 
(0.50) 
0.50 
(0.50) 
0.49
(0.50) 
Age  15.79 (0.28) 
15.72 
(0.28) 
15.70 
(0.28) 
15.62
(0.29) 
15.79
(0.28)
15.70
(0.27) 
15.71
(0.28) 
15.63
(0.28) 
15.72
(0.28) 
15.72
(0.28) 
15.73 
(0.28) 
15.70 
(0.28) 
15.70
(0.28) 
15.72
(0.28) 
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Parents' origin  0.31 (0.46) 
0.08 
(0.27) 
0.21 
(0.41) 
0.18 
(0.38) 
0.25
(0.43)
0.11
(0.31) 
0.04
(0.19) 
0.06
(0.24) 
0.05
(0.22) 
0.40
(0.49) 
0.11 
(0.31) 
0.37 
(0.48) 
0.13 
(0.33) 
0.21
(0.41) 
Language  0.11 (0.32) 
0.01 
(0.07) 
0.08 
(0.27) 
0.04 
(0.20) 
0.05
(0.22)
0.03
(0.16) --- 
0.02
(0.13) 
0.18
(0.38) 
0.07
(0.25) 
0.06 
(0.24) 
0.10 
(0.30) 
0.07 
(0.26) 
0.07
(0.26) 
Books at home               
  < 11 0.06 (0.24) 
0.03 
(0.16) 
0.08 
(0.28) 
0.09 
(0.28) 
0.12 
(0.32)
0.11 
(0.32) 
0.05 
(0.21) 
0.03 
(0.17) 
0.09 
(0.29) 
0.04 
(0.19) 
0.07 
(0.25) 
0.06 
(0.24) 
0.07 
(0.26) 
0.06 
(0.23) 
  11-25  0.18 (0.38) 
0.11 
(0.32) 
0.20 
(0.40) 
0.21 
(0.41) 
0.22
(0.41)
0.28
(0.45) 
0.14
(0.34) 
0.11
(0.31) 
0.21
(0.41) 
0.10
(0.30) 
0.14 
(0.35) 
0.17 
(0.38) 
0.17 
(0.38) 
0.14
(0.35) 
  26-100  0.20 (0.40) 
0.21 
(0.41) 
0.23 
(0.42) 
0.21 
(0.41) 
0.22
(0.42)
0.27
(0.44) 
0.20
(0.40) 
0.21
(0.41) 
0.23
(0.42) 
0.19
(0.39) 
0.19 
(0.39) 
0.22 
(0.41) 
0.20 
(0.40) 
0.18
(0.39) 
  101-200  0.24 (0.43) 
0.28 
(0.45) 
0.21 
(0.41) 
0.21 
(0.41) 
0.22
(0.41)
0.17
(0.38) 
0.22
(0.41) 
0.26
(0.44) 
0.21
(0.41) 
0.28
(0.45) 
0.23 
(0.42) 
0.23 
(0.42) 
0.22 
(0.42) 
0.24
(0.43) 
  >200  0.32 (0.47) 
0.36 
(0.48) 
0.28 
(0.45) 
0.28 
(0.45) 
0.22
(0.42)
0.17
(0.38) 
0.40
(0.49) 
0.40
(0.49) 
0.26
(0.44) 
0.40
(0.49) 
0.37 
(0.48) 
0.32 
(0.47) 
0.33 
(0.47) 
0.37
(0.48) 
Parents‘ educ.               
  No Second. 0.06 (0.24) 
0.01 
(0.11) 
0.07 
(0.25) 
0.07 
(0.26) 
0.14 
(0.34)
0.15 
(0.36) 
0.06 
(0.23) 
0.13 
(0.33) 
0.26 
(0.44) 
0.03 
(0.18) 
0.07 
(0.26) 
0.06 
(0.24) 
0.03 
(0.16) 
0.06 
(0.24) 
  Upper Second. --- 0.29 (0.46) 
0.41 
(0.49) 
0.30 
(0.46) 
0.22
(0.41)
0.05
(0.22) 
0.29
(0.46) 
0.24
(0.42) 
0.12
(0.33) 
0.03
(0.18) 
0.15 
(0.35) 
0.26 
(0.44) 
0.03 
(0.16) 
0.08
(0.28) 
  Post-Second. 0.27 (0.44) 
0.45 
(0.50) 
0.11 
(0.31) 
0.09 
(0.28) 
0.15
(0.36)
0.24
(0.43) 
0.36
(0.48) 
0.21
(0.41) 
0.36
(0.48) 
0.48
(0.50) 
0.22 
(0.41) 
0.08 
(0.28) 
0.50 
(0.50) 
0.24
(0.43) 
  University 0.66 (0.47) 
0.25 
(0.43) 
0.40 
(0.49) 
0.52 
(0.50) 
0.46
(0.50)
0.43
(0.50) 
0.28
(0.45) 
0.37
(0.48) 
0.21
(0.41) 
0.45
(0.50) 
0.54 
(0.50) 
0.57 
(0.49) 
0.45 
(0.50) 
0.60
(0.49) 
School location               
  City  --- 0.30 (0.46) 
0.24 
(0.43) 
0.35 
(0.48) 
0.19
(0.39)
0.33
(0.47) 
0.42
(0.49) --- 
0.29
(0.46) 
0.30
(0.46) 
0.11 
(0.32) 
0.46 
(0.50) 
0.37 
(0.48) 
0.17
(0.38) 
  Town --- 0.61 (0.49) 
0.69 
(0.46) 
0.56 
(0.50) 
0.74 
(0.44)
0.63 
(0.48) 
0.56 
(0.50) --- 
0.69 
(0.46) 
0.47 
(0.50) 
0.49 
(0.50) 
0.42 
(0.49) 
0.32 
(0.47) 
0.60 
(0.49) 
  Rural  --- 0.09 (0.28) 
0.07 
(0.26) 
0.09 
(0.28) 
0.07
(0.25)
0.05
(0.21) 
0.02
(0.15) --- 
0.02
(0.14) 
0.23
(0.42) 
0.40 
(0.49) 
0.13 
(0.33) 
0.31 
(0.46) 
0.22
(0.42) 
Parents‘ attit.               
  High  0.15 (0.36) 
0.09 
(0.29) 
0.09 
(0.29) 
0.13 
(0.33) 
0.20
(0.40)
0.15
(0.36) 
0.23
(0.42) 
0.17
(0.38) 
0.27
(0.44) 
0.22
(0.41) 
0.10 
(0.29) 
0.16 
(0.36) 
0.23 
(0.42) 
0.09
(0.29) 
  Medium 0.70 (0.46) 
0.69 
(0.46) 
0.70 
(0.46) 
0.73 
(0.44) 
0.69 
(0.46)
0.74 
(0.44) 
0.67 
(0.47) 
0.67 
(0.47) 
0.63 
(0.48) 
0.66 
(0.47) 
0.68 
(0.47) 
0.70 
(0.46) 
0.62 
(0.49) 
0.71 
(0.45) 
  Low  0.15 (0.35) 
0.22 
(0.41) 
0.21 
(0.40) 
0.14 
(0.35) 
0.10
(0.30)
0.11
(0.31) 
0.09
(0.29) 
0.16
(0.36) 
0.10
(0.30) 
0.12
(0.33) 
0.22 
(0.42) 
0.15 
(0.36) 
0.15 
(0.36) 
0.20
(0.40) 
Values are weighted by the sampling probability of the students. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. 
For scores, all observations with imputed values were dropped. For student background variables, only the 
observations for which values of the respective variable were missing were dropped. 
 
Table A4: Missing values in percent 
 CAN CZE DEU ENG FRA GRC HUN ISL ITA LVA NOR NZL RUS SWE
PIRLS          
Parents' origin  16.08 12.11 12.03 44.69 10.13 12.63 4.41 15.98 3.60 4.45 9.03 15.34 1.42 9.08
Language  2.42 1.16 3.23 0.35 2.31 1.41 1.31 2.67 0.29 1.13 1.51 1.46 1.20 2.11
Books at home 10.76 3.73 8.26 4.03 6.97 2.91 4.06 5.75 2.46 5.34 1.83 7.81 5.16 2.90
Parents‘ educ. 18.30 14.94 34.96 48.62 20.92 16.22 8.97 16.20 4.20 11.55 10.06 17.82 1.54 9.42
School location 9.03 16.47 27.73 26.74 24.69 19.17 40.47 28.47 2.51 28.00 19.78 14.89 34.38 10.87
Parents‘ attit. 17.46 17.24 14.72 45.62 13.85 14.61 6.43 18.02 13.19 8.23 10.98 17.33 6.99 9.36
PISA      
Parents' origin  0.59 0.56 1.91 1.92 5.41 2.99 2.18 1.69 1.19 1.69 2.61 1.93 1.62 0.80
Language  2.08 0.85 8.57 0.91 3.25 1.07 100.00 0.47 5.27 1.85 6.84 4.49 0.85 2.77
Books at home 0.60 0.29 1.49 1.21 0.82 0.50 0.64 0.16 0.54 0.96 0.76 1.07 0.97 0.28
Parents‘ educ. 4.74 4.33 18.35 15.36 12.04 6.53 5.53 8.36 4.41 12.21 10.78 26.79 20.04 10.06
School location 99.77 0.00 9.66 7.62 10.53 1.62 0.52 100.00 0.00 16.32 4.09 0.00 0.00 1.79
Parents‘ attit. 0.89 0.33 1.57 1.19 0.93 0.96 0.31 0.56 0.46 0.68 0.64 0.74 2.75 0.46
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Figure A 1: Mean scores and standard deviations for PIRLS (slope not significant) 
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Figure A 2: Mean scores and standard deviations for PISA (slope not significant) 
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Table A5: Correlation of variables between PIRLS and PISA 
 Including imputed values 
Without imputed 
values 
Parents' origin  0.84 0.84 
Language  0.13 0.04 
Books at home   
  < 11 0.73 0.83 
  11-25  0.65 0.79 
  26-100  0.52 0.77 
  101-200  0.80 0.79 
  >200  0.80 0.80 
Parents‘ education   
  No Second. 0.43 0.67 
  Upper Second. 0.05 0.20 
  Post-Second. 0.16 0.19 
  University 0.53 0.72 
School location   
  City  0.42 0.48 
  Town 0.59 0.56 
  Rural  0.12 0.32 
Correlation coefficients of country means. 
 
Table A6: Estimates for grade 4 (PIRLS) without imputed values 
 CAN CZE DEU ENG FRA GRC HUN ISL ITA LVA NOR NZL RUS SWE
Female  17.14* 10.47* 8.81* 18.82* 7.39† 17.40* 15.40* 20.47 * 6.91* 20.02* 18.53* 30.40* 12.54* 21.78*
Age  -4.44 -1.36 -8.18* 45.03* -21.49* 1.59 -9.46* 25.63 * 12.95* -8.67* 25.28* 12.44‡ -5.42 4.44 
Parents' origin  -4.59‡ -7.02 -15.77* 4.92 -6.72‡ -11.35* -6.36 -9.51 † -16.73* -0.59 2.80 4.85 -16.51* -9.41*
Language  -25.52* -23.58* -25.28* -49.44* -21.37* -15.85† -42.67* -28.56 * -29.27* -12.35‡ -34.61* -44.21* -36.75* -27.36*
Books at home 
  26-100  6.68‡ 15.48* 13.38* 7.86 8.39† 17.76‡ 16.75* 3.36  14.27* 5.20 20.69† 9.20 4.91 12.17*
  101-200  10.86† 27.71* 31.26* 31.39* 21.74* 30.15* 20.16* 15.45 † 22.90* 10.62† 35.49* 14.15 13.03† 15.07*
  >200  18.93* 36.00* 38.63* 28.71* 29.10* 39.81* 37.08* 24.44 * 38.47* 14.99* 41.17* 24.78* 16.88† 25.14*
Parents´ educ. 
  Upper Second. 11.14‡ 16.56† 27.49* 6.73 15.40* 12.99* 24.13* 25.08 * 19.58* 18.78* 20.27‡ 18.19‡ 6.49 16.60*
  Post-Second. 24.86* 31.10* 21.70* 26.94‡ 26.35* 22.46* 25.80* 33.64 * 10.02 18.90* --  35.33* 13.45‡ 23.72*
  University 48.52* 37.18* 35.50* 34.35* 37.51* 46.19* 53.78* 54.20 * 27.42* 42.82* 45.44* 59.47* 29.52* 39.81*
School location 
  City  2.10 11.20† -5.53 5.12 5.46 9.28 2.97 3.67  -4.54 8.31‡ 15.39† 21.71* -0.10 2.59 
  Rural  -11.08† -2.30 3.88 -4.77 8.68 -3.31 -5.83 -1.20  -26.54† -5.56 7.17 -7.77 --  -1.15 
Parents´ attit. 
  High  12.86* 10.17* 12.46* 25.86* 11.69* 9.76† 9.66* -0.78  18.56* 9.22* 12.76† 32.99* 11.29* 9.40*
  Low  -10.07‡ -1.33 0.28 -4.20 -2.48 7.98 6.70 -5.12  -2.12 -15.04‡ 2.16 -2.46 3.42 -8.44 
 Observations 5,288 1,948 3,066 1,095 1,783 1,610 2,376 1,954 2,838 1,740 2,297 1,537 2,315 4,631 
 R-Square 0.16 0.16 0.28 0.21 0.27 0.24 0.28 0.17 0.17 0.20 0.16 0.25 0.15 0.18 
Coefficients from cluster-robust linear regressions (CRLR), weighted by students‘sampling probabilities. 
Significance-levels:  * 1 percent, † 5 percent, ‡ 10 percent. Dependent variable: PIRLS reading literacy score. 
All observations with imputed values have been dropped. 
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Table A7: Estimates for grade 9/10 (PISA) without imputed values 
 CAN CZE DEU ENG FRA GRC HUN ISL ITA LVA NOR NZL RUS SWE
Female  26.74* 20.60* 20.44* 20.87* 15.39* 33.15* 23.34* 34.58* 25.29* 43.90* 33.66* 35.55* 30.00* 27.92*
Age  -0.96 -29.27* -49.51* 16.75* 0.69 8.42 -35.30* 9.37‡ 11.63* -22.65* 20.52* 27.62* -10.43‡ 15.53*
Parents' origin  2.46 7.61† -5.39 6.27 -8.81* 4.91 -3.27 -7.41 10.94† -10.14‡ -3.22 1.53 6.19 -3.84 
Language  -28.98* 16.10 -42.94* -33.31* -21.93* -27.11* --  -31.57† -27.28* -8.92 -49.01* -73.12* -7.08 -39.79*
Books at home 
  26-100  19.27* 24.06* 26.37* 24.64* 17.19* 18.17* 24.35* 16.07* 15.70* 1.24 18.64* 20.96* 14.74* 25.51*
  101-200  28.91* 41.90* 41.47* 50.67* 28.78* 28.58* 48.11* 35.98* 28.00* 24.87* 47.44* 42.37* 42.46* 36.60*
  >200  39.35* 61.91* 61.59* 68.86* 40.31* 42.94* 69.11* 50.57* 36.20* 42.01* 56.80* 54.57* 51.02* 60.20*
Parents´ educ. 
  Upper Second. --  1.89 28.43* 18.80* 3.01 17.53* 25.91* 18.39* 12.99* 13.70 16.15† 29.18* 23.95† 9.10 
  Post-Second. --  25.52* 37.58* 53.63* 9.44† 28.25* 51.39* 21.57* 22.41* 24.55* 8.89 44.28* 37.48* 13.75†
  University 21.51* 56.90* 52.00* 35.44* 8.85† 39.71* 75.20* 30.30* 27.08* 31.75* 19.35* 47.57* 45.16* 11.95†
School location 
  City  --  -0.33 -5.73 0.72 5.59 13.49 16.78† --  5.21 17.59‡ 3.18 12.76† 17.85† 5.79 
  Rural  --  -20.05* -33.49* -7.76 -0.279 -13.24 -28.44‡ --  6.44 -32.90* -9.76‡ -14.55† -17.54† -6.93‡
Parents´ attit 
  High  21.91* 9.38† 10.98† 29.47* 7.35* 6.01 7.83* 13.93* 1.59 12.59* 23.19* 20.76* 8.45* 14.84*
  Low  -26.01* -20.71* -21.91* -26.31* -11.28* -19.98* -11.15* -27.73* -21.94* -15.69* -33.91* -19.94* -18.37* -32.23*
 Observations 26,815 4,865 3,398 7,007 3,353 4,036 4,401 2,868 4,283 2,711 3,160 2,526 5,087 3,728 
 R-Square 0.20 0.30 0.37 0.22 0.50 0.23 0.42 0.16 0.26 0.29 0.20 0.22 0.22 0.22 
Coefficients from cluster-robust linear regressions (CRLR), weighted by students‘sampling probabilities. 
Significance-levels:  * 1 percent, † 5 percent, ‡ 10 percent. Dependent variable: PIRLS reading literacy score. 
All observations with imputed values have been dropped. 
 
Table A8: Results from two-step model 
 School types 
Instruction 
time 
Share of 
students in 
private 
schools 
School 
autonomy 
Female  
0.94 
(2.37) 
0.006 
(0.006) 
-0.77 
(0.86) 
-1.47 
(0.79) 
Parents' origin  
15.43* 
(3.22) 
-0.002 
(0.001) 
-1.95 
(2.26) 
-3.90‡ 
(1.70) 
Language  
-4.84 
(7.50) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
-3.01 
(3.13) 
-0.48 
(4.33) 
>200 Books at home  0.05 
(8.33) 
-0.003 
(0.002) 
8.57* 
(1.57) 
3.24 
(3.63) 
One parent univ. deg.  
14.43† 
(5.94) 
-.0003 
(0.002) 
-0.07 
(2.86) 
  0.77 
(3.81) 
School location     
City 
  2.09 
(4.19) 
0.0003 
(0.0008) 
-0.60 
(1.72) 
-1.01 
(2.02) 
Rural 
9.04 
(6.69) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
-1.44 
(3.20) 
-3.48 
(3.32) 
Parents‘ attitude     
High 
-6.55‡ 
(3.47) 
0.0001 
(0.001) 
1.94 
(1.55) 
2.09 
(1.87) 
Low 
0.96 
(3.31) 
0.0008 
(0.0007) 
1.53 
(1.07) 
  1.94 
(1.39) 
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WLS regressions, each cell represents a separate regression. Coefficients significant at the 10 percent-level  
are printed in bold. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance-levels:  * 1 percent. † 5 percent. ‡ 10 percent. 
Estimated using equation (8) for autonomy and equation (7) for other institutions. 
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Figure A 3: Non-parametric regression estimates of changes in opportunities on institutional changes
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Table A9: Institutional variables 
Variable CAN CZE DEU ENG FRA GRC HUN ISL ITA LVA NOR NZL RUS SWE 
Institutions               
Number of school types in primary education1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Number of school types in lower secondary1 1 2 3 3 1 2 2 1 3 1 1 2 2 1 
Yearly instruction time in minutes in PIRLS2 24,583 24,741 23,560 23,462 23,563 18,152 --- 19,614 29,289 14,145 19,742 29,962 16,623 24,243 
Yearly instruction time in minutes in PISA3 58,576 56,804 54,547 57,369 61,304 47,947 52,231 50,935 61,769 51,142 --- 57,881 51,534 53,615 
Share of students in private schools in primary 
education in 2000 (in percent)4 6.5 .9 2.2 4.7 15 7 5.1 1.4 6.4 2 1.5 2 0.4 .4 
Share of students in private schools in lower 
secondary education in 2000 (in percent)4 8 2 7 7 21 5 5 1 4 4 2 4 1 3 
Percentage of women among teaching staff in 
public and private institutions in primary education, 
based on head counts5 
68 84.4 81.2 81.1 80 --- 85 77.8 94.8 --- --- 83.8 98.7 80.4 
Percentage of women among teaching staff in 
public and private institutions at lower secondary, 
based on head counts5 
68 82 59 59 64 64 85 77 73 88 72 65 89 62 
Index of school autonomy in lower secondary6 5.68 7.77 3.90 6.47 --- 3.10 6.89 6.46 2.43 --- 5.12 6.67 3.60 6.05 
Educational expenditures               
Expenditure on educational institutions as a 
percentage of GDP 20007 6.4 4.6 5.3 5.3 6.1 4.0 5.0 6.3 4.9 --- 5.9 5.8 --- 6.5 
Private education expenditures as a percentage of 
total education expenditures (all levels), 19988 11.0 12.8 21.6 5.7 5.8 --- 11.6 
11.0 
(1995) 3.9 --- 1.9 
2.6 
(1995) --- 2.7 
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Variable CAN CZE DEU ENG FRA GRC HUN ISL ITA LVA NOR NZL RUS SWE 
Country and population                
Female employment rate in % 9 74.0 73.7 71.1 73.1 69.6 52.6 61.7 87.4 50.7 --- 81.5 70.6 --- 81.7 
Stock of foreign population in % (1999)10 17.411 2.2 8.8 3.8 5.6 2.7 1.3 1.512 2.2 41.813 4.0 24.213 --- 5.5 
Urban population in % (2003)14 80.4 74.3 88.1 89.1 76.3 60.8 65.1 92.8 67.4 66.2 78.6 85.9 73.3 83.4 
1 Source: National descriptions in Eurybase; Statistics Canada, New Zealand. 
2 Source: PIRLS 2001 database. 
3 Source: PISA 2000 databse 
4 Source: OECD Education at a Glance 2002, C2.4. 
5 Source: OECD Education at a Glance 2002, D8.2. 
6 Source: OECD PISA database, 2001, Web Table D5.2. 
7 Source: Education at a Glance 2003, Tab. B2.1a. 
8 Source: EdStats, http://devdata.worldbank.org/edstats/ThematicDataOnEducation/PrivateEducationExpenditure/tab21.xls  
9 Source: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/36/7/17652667.pdf 
10 Source: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/23/41/2508596.pdf 
11 1998, source: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/10/35/2079451.pdf 
12 2002, source: Berliner Institut für Vergleichende Sozialforschung, http://www.emz-berlin.de/Statistik_2/lat/lat_01.htm 
13 Source: http://www.nationmaster.com 
14 Source: UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, „Urban and Rural Areas 2003“. 
 
